The fatal contradiction of the defense cost share, is it worth paying?

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▲ Ambassador Chung Eun-bo (right) and Donna Welton, U.S. Department of State’s defense cost-sharing negotiator (Senior Assistant to the Political and Military Affairs Bureau) are taking commemorative photos prior to the 9th ROK-US defense negotiations held in Washington, DC.
Ⓒ Provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	See related photos

The’Korea-US Defense Expenses Contribution Special Agreement (SMA)’ was concluded. According to a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea’s defense cost contribution to the United States this year is KRW 1,183.3 billion, up 13.9% from the previous year. Until 2025, the increase rate of the previous year’s defense spending will be applied and the increase will be continued.

There are so many problems that it is breathtaking to discuss one by one, but only the main content is pointed out.

First of all, the total amount increased unprecedentedly. It increased by 144.4 billion won from the 1,389 trillion won in defense expenses in 2020, which was frozen to the level in 2019, which was in a state of no agreement due to unreasonable demand from the Trump administration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that an extraordinary rate of increase came out as an additional increase of 7.4% in defense spending and 6.5% in the labor cost increase for Korean workers in 2020 was added.

The labor cost increase means that the ratio of labor costs paid to Korean workers in the USFK has been increased from 75% to 85%, and was additionally paid. Considering the method of paying the defense cost share based on the total amount unlike Japan, the labor cost It is not convincing that the increase will be raised separately. It means that the increase in labor costs could be resolved by adjusting the ratio with other components of the defense cost share, such as military construction costs or logistics support costs. That’s why even officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense say, “This is an exceptional growth rate, and it is undeniable that it is somewhat excessive.

A bigger problem is that the rate of increase in defense expenditures is applied as a basis for the increase in defense expenditures. Prior to negotiations with the Trump administration, the standard for raising the defense cost share agreed by the ROK and the United States was linked to the inflation rate. This is an inexhaustible set of standards, whereas there was evidence that more than 80% of the defense cost share consisted of military construction costs and labor costs. In the past five years, the average growth rate of Korean consumer prices is around 1%, while the increase rate of defense spending under the Defense Mid-term Plan (2021~2025) is 6.1%. In the end, they agreed to raise the defense cost share annually by more than five times compared to the previous agreement. In 2025, when this agreement ends, a defense cost share of nearly 1.5 trillion won will be given to the United States.

Increasing defense expenditure also increases defense expenditure… Strange negotiations

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▲ Yearly changes in USFK defense cost contributions due to the 11th ROK-US defense negotiations. Materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ⓒ Provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	See related photos

There are more contradictions. In an alliance relationship, the defense cost share and defense cost are basically inversely proportional to each other. The cost of the alliance can be divided into a method of paying expenses to the host country (cost sharing), such as a defense cost share, and a method of increasing the common defense power of the alliance by increasing the defense expenses of the parties (burden sharing).

However, if the burden sharing increases, the cost sharing will decrease. This is why the United States is forcing European allies, such as South Korea, to increase its defense expenditures. However, in this agreement, the basic principle of burdening alliance costs was applied in reverse.

South Korea’s increase in defense expenditures is to increase its own defense capabilities, but the more it does, the more the defense expenditures paid directly to the United States increase as well, resulting in a strange situation. Recalling that the Moon Jae-in administration’s defense expenditure higher than the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations was based on a policy of redeeming opposition rights and reducing dependence on the United States, the logic of increasing the defense cost share by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is contradictory.

Why?

Above all, there is no basis for why it should be uploaded. The main reason for the increase in the defense cost share since the 2000s was the increase in military construction costs due to the construction of the US military base in Pyeongtaek. This was a social controversy as a case of illegal use of USFK’s defense cost share. From the table below, it can be seen that the military construction cost has led to the increase in the defense cost share for over 10 years since the late 2000s, when the construction project for the US military base in Pyeongtaek was in full swing. The ratio has also increased significantly.

However, with the construction project of the US military base in Pyeongtaek at the end and hundreds of billions of won of unused funds remain,’why’ and’for what’ should be raised? As mentioned, the expenditure for defense cost share is set as military construction cost, logistical support cost, and labor cost, and the limit that can be used is set.

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▲ Distribution amount and ratio by item of defense expenditure contribution (2002~18) Table of data on the allocation and ratio of ROK-US defense expenditures by item from 2002 to 2018.
Ⓒ Park Seok-jin	See related photos

According to an official from the Ministry of Defense, the cost of deploying strategic weapons that the Trump administration requested, the cost of operating supplementary power such as THAAD, and the cost of rotating US forces in Korea are not included in the contribution. There is no specific reason for raising the defense cost share other than mentioning that the issue of the ROK-US alliance has been resolved anywhere in the presentation materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

If the US intends to use the money received from South Korea for a place different from the purpose of the defense cost share, as in the case of exclusive use of the construction cost of the Pyeongtaek US military base, the operating cost of the US Forces in Japan, and the USFK’s activities outside the Korean Peninsula, this may cause a completely different problem. have.

Even in this negotiation, the authority of the National Assembly was again ignored. The procedure for signing and ratification remains, but there is a high possibility that it will be reduced to a catering act as in previous years. Recommendations such as the issue of unexecuted payments for defense cost contributions raised during the 9th negotiations, the issue of cost conversion, and the recommendation to submit it to the National Assembly before budget deliberation have become pieces of paper.

It seems that only the political judgment that Biden should resolve the issue of defense cost sharing early after the inauguration of the US administration and the US schedule were taken into account. Except for a small number of progressive parties, it is difficult to even raise the same problems from the large ruling party and the opposition party. This is why the expectation that this irrational agreement could be revised using the National Assembly’s right to ratify is difficult.

Negotiations where you don’t know why you need to push

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▲ President Biden makes his first visit to the State Department after taking office US President Joe Biden is giving a speech on foreign policy at the Washington DC State Department building on February 4 (local time), while Secretary of State Tony Blincoln listens.
Ⓒ Washington EPA = Yonhap News	See related photos

As a candidate, Joe Biden, who criticized Trump’s demands for defense cost-sharing as “an act of extortion against the alliance,” became president, using the leverage of the negotiations that Trump had pushed into the craziness and gaining everything that South Korea could obtain. The period was divided into five years, and the 50% increase in defense cost contributions that Trump actually intended was achieved.

The analysis of the US list that it is difficult to persuade the Republicans to convince the Republicans in a situation where cooperation from the Republican Party is necessary to resolve pending issues such as the coronavirus situation in the United States is important. It seems to be a measure of how the Eden government will treat Korea in the future.

The main analysis is that the Moon Jae-in administration has accepted the unreasonable demands of the United States in order to obtain cooperation from the United States in the reactivation of the peace process on the Korean peninsula that is intended to be promoted at the end of the rule. Unfortunately, however, it seems unlikely that the United States will engage in cooperation with North Korea in the way that South Korea wants it.

Although the Biden administration’s policy toward North Korea is still under review, the top-down summit meeting between the United States and the United States, which played a major role in the peace situation on the Korean Peninsula, shows no signs and the possibility of intensifying sanctions and pressure on North Korea is growing. . On the 10th (local time), U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blincoln said at a hearing on the House Foreign Relations Committee in a question related to the declaration of an end to the Korean Peninsula: “We must make sure that allied partners such as Korea and Japan are doing their best to improve security, It should be clarified whether this has been taken into account.”

In his words, it is not the time to talk about the end of the war, and the security situation of allies should be evaluated first. This is contrary to the Moon Jae-in administration’s plan to create momentum for denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula through the declaration of an end to the war.

The cost of the alliance is meaningful when it helps peace

As I have repeatedly mentioned, an alliance is nothing more than a means of peace. When the ROK-US alliance contributes to peace on the Korean Peninsula, the cost for the alliance is also meaningful.

But what about the reality? The US deployed USFK missile defense system THAAD, causing fierce security conflicts between Korea and China, and the difficult-beginning of the peace situation on the Korean peninsula ceased when dialogue between the US and the United States ceased.

Furthermore, it forms a quad, which is the siege strategy chain of Asia with China, and demands explicit participation from Korea. Isn’t the alliance delaying peace rather than bringing peace and leading it to a wider swamp of conflict? This is a suspicion that arises from reviewing the results of the 11th ROK-US Special Agreement on Defense Expenses Sharing Agreement.