[Focus 인사이드]The reason why the Korean peninsula is unsettled by the Chinese navy, as it was during the Chinese-Japanese War

The area of ​​responsibility for the North Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy (AOR) is the West Sea (Yellow Sea) and the neighboring waters. Geographically and historically, the Korean Peninsula and the West Sea are the closest to Beijing, the capital city of China, and the West Sea is responsible for the’strategic pathway’ connected to the Bohai Bay.

Historically, as shown in the’Incheon Landing Operation’ and the’Blue-Japanese War’, the history of the invasion of the Korean peninsula by China and Japan was key to the conquest of the West Sea. China believes that the stability of the Korean Peninsula and the West Sea is necessary to realize the importance of economic development,’Chinese dream’ and’Ganggun dream’.

Against this background, China is increasing its naval power. US government ministries focus on increasing the number of Chinese ships, improving the combat system, and the ability to engage in joint warfare with other military types.

“Chinese Military Power Report 2020” by the U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report” by the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee (USCC), “Chinese Navy Modernization” by the Congressional Investigation Bureau (CRS), and “China’s Military Power 2019” by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). 』, etc.

For example, from 2005 to 2020, the total number of ships in China increased by 117 from 216 to 333. By comparison, the number of US ships in the same period was 296, an increase of 15 from 281. It is true that the Chinese Navy is the world’s largest in terms of ship size.

Attention is drawn to the quantitative expansion of China’s naval ships. In particular, two carriers, one cruiser (type 055), 23 missile destroyers (type 052D), 30 missile frigates (type 054), 4 nuclear-propelled strategic missile submarines (SSBN), and nuclear-propelled attack submarines ( 6 SSN), 1 helicopter assault and landing ship (075 type LHA), and 7 amphibious transport ships (071 type, LPD) showed an increase in representative positions.

Combat system development is seen in various missiles. The standard YJ-83 (range 180㎞) for the Jangkai II frigate, the YJ-62 (400㎞) for the Luyang II destroyer, and the latest YJ-18A (537㎞) anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) for the Luyang III and Renhai cruisers Is equipped.

One of the most striking aspects of the Chinese military reform at this stage is the expansion of the Marine Corps (Naval Army Squadron). Before the reform (2015), there were only 10,000 people. Now it has increased to 8 brigades, and the total troops are estimated at 40,000.

The prediction that the Chinese naval buildup trend will continue in the future is supported by this form of modernization.

The ships owned by the Chinese Navy are deployed in a relatively even distribution in the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. According to the U.S. Department of Defense data, the North Sea Fleet consists of one carrier, four nuclear-propelled attack submarines, 14 conventional submarines, one cruiser, nine destroyers, 12 frigates, 10 Corvettes, 18 missiles, and a total of medium-sized landing ships. It has 7 ships.

The differences between the fleets are quite clear. All four nuclear-propelled strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) are attached to the South Sea Fleet, and the East Sea Fleet facing Taiwan has no nuclear-propelled submarines, but instead has a total of 25 various landing ships. .

All Chinese naval analysis data and estimates were made in the United States. The reason is obvious. This is because the United States has the most information about the Chinese military and the Chinese navy and discloses it. ‘Strike in China’ is also playing a part.

Korea should carefully review and reference data from the United States and analyze it based on the security needs of Korea, not the United States. In addition to China’s North Sea Fleet and Northern Light Area, it is important to keep in mind the growing importance of the Taiwan Strait and the changing situation in the South China Sea. In addition, it should be recognized that the Chinese military poses a challenge and threat to our security, even if it does not achieve the goal of’Kanggunmong.

There are a number of things we need to analyze about the Chinese Navy, but the following two things must be kept in mind. One is to have the habit of continually tracking down to specific and detailed matters about the Chinese navy.

For example, you need to know the ship number or armed status of submarines and major surface ships. You can synthesize and analyze data from the US Department of Defense and the US Naval Intelligence Service (ONI).

As another example, it is necessary to track the recent situation of upgrading and upgrading such as two Luyang (type 052), one Luhai (type 051B), and two Sobremenni class, and the armament status of these major surface ships is changing.

Another example is the need to track weaknesses such as Chinese naval coordination, logistical support, and training, especially training situations. More specifically, information exchange with the US Navy, defense of track tracking torpedoes, promotion of the’Navy Conference’ with China, and expansion of maritime (naval) cooperation with neighboring countries are necessary.

The other can be called the role of the navy in the’informed local war’ promoted by the Chinese military. Basically, the North Sea Fleet is the Northern Front Navy, and is under command and control (C2) from the Northern Front Command, not the Navy. We need to track how rigid and limited C2 has been linked to the expansion of the naval role.

The Chinese Navy, like other military types, is promoting brigade and standardization. Changes in fleets and zones belonging to the northern regions reflect this. Recent changes in the deployment area of ​​the North Sea Fleet’s forces can be tracked in public data.

For example, the 5th and 6th Naval Army Brigades are all deployed in Shandong Province. In addition to the C2, the continued tracking of the North Sea Fleet’s various joint efforts, electronic warfare capabilities, and the promotion of the satellite-based C4ISR system will not only identify the naval trends of neighboring countries, but also strengthen Korea’s maritime security.

Taeho Kim Professor, Hallym University