Diplomacy: Politics: News: Hankyoreh

Former Russian ambassador to the Republic of Korea Sae-Rak has been a major part of North Korea’s nuclear program and diplomacy for 36 years from 1979 to 2015. When he was young, he was in charge of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and in October 2002, he led the response as North American chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the’second North Korean nuclear crisis’, which began with the suspicion of uranium enrichment in North Korea. From 2009, he served as the head of the Korean Peninsula Peace Bargaining Headquarters, the chief representative of the six-party talks on North Korean nuclear weapons, and led two rounds of denuclearization talks, contributing to the 2012 North Korea-US ‘2.29 Agreement’. Diplomats call him’the best diplomatic strategist’. Behind the’strategist’ is the sincerity and cold judgment of analyzing the data closely. As a diplomat, I worked every morning on the principle of’never talk about analysis until I have looked at all the information’, and even after my last resignation as the Russian ambassador to the Republic of Korea, I am not missing out on research on the international situation. Recently, a book has been published that analyzes North Korea’s nuclear weapons and diplomatic relations with the Fourth Powers since 2016 and contains reform plans for South Korea’s diplomacy. On the 23rd, at the Hankyoreh Newspaper, I met with former Ambassador Wi and heard about the reform issues of Korean diplomacy, the intensifying conflict between the US and China, and the direction of Korean diplomacy amid the inauguration of the Biden administration. ―Why did you suggest upgrading Korean diplomacy? “During my 36 years working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I felt the problem that Korean diplomacy was focused only on administration and events, and I continued to think that policy and strategy should be upgraded. As a young man in charge of northern diplomacy, he played a role in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It was a historical moment when the Cold War ended and the post-Cold War era began, and it was a period of East-West reconciliation, when our diplomacy, which was one of the western sides, first flew with both east and west wings. Even at such a turning point, our diplomacy could not go beyond diplomatic events to a qualitative change in which we devised strategies for both East and West camps and conduct diplomacy worthy of the post-Cold War. In 1988, the Korean government issued the ‘7.7 Declaration’ and declared that we support diplomatic relations with China and the Soviet Union and support North Korea’s diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan. Contacting with was opposed. From the North Korean perspective, feelings of deprivation and betrayal were great, but we were buried in a sort of triumphantism and tried to do what we wanted. At that time, when Soviet Foreign Minister Sevardnadze went to Pyongyang to announce diplomatic relations between Korea and Russia, North Korea’s Kim Young-nam announced his intention to develop nuclear weapons, and that was the beginning of the North Korean nuclear issue. Treating the post-Cold War as a Cold War style brought the results of the present. Even now, our diplomacy is unfamiliar with formulating and executing strategies centered on our own judgment and national interests.” ―Where should the upgrade of Korean diplomacy begin? “The reason Korean diplomacy has become this way is because the diplomatic ecosystem is distorted. Korea’s diplomacy is in the five main pitfalls of egocentric and emotional perspective, domestic politics, ideological partisanism, populism, and amateurism. In this ecosystem, the problems of the ruling elite, bureaucrats, politics, the media, academia, and civil society organizations, which are the six major actors leading Korean diplomacy, overlap. First of all, the perception that the Korean diplomatic ecosystem needs to be changed must spread across the society. If the ruling elite tries to implement the reform task, it will be the fastest, and in the second best, diplomatic officials should play the role. To do so, first, diplomatic officials must shift from focusing on’specs’ such as whether they worked in the United States to respect and nurture true professionalism. It is also important for the media, academia, and civil society organizations to play a role in reform as a source of oversight and formation of public opinion.” -In the situation of the US-China’New Cold War’, Korea continues to struggle between the US and Chinese sides, and the domestic division is only getting worse. What strategy should Korea come up with between the US and China? “There are three opinions in Korean society. First of all, there is a claim that the United States is strong, so you can follow the United States. The second is that this game will eventually be won by China, so they have to lean towards China. The third group is those who try to do nothing while avoiding the problem. Previously, they followed the big country, but now that they don’t know who the big country is, they say that they should move toward a strong pull for convenience and not decide which one to choose. The choice we have to make is not whether we choose China or the United States. We have to choose our coordinates and the direction to go out. Otherwise, you will have to make endless concessions, drifting and wandering under the traction of the United States and China. The criterion for choosing coordinates and directions is’not to compromise our sovereignty and values’. China has imposed a Chinese order on us for thousands of years. For the first time in the past 100 years, Korea has gone out of its orbit and has succeeded in market economy and liberal democracy. Those two values ​​are the identity of Korea. China has succeeded with different values ​​and has become the world’s second powerhouse, and now tries to impose that value on other countries, especially neighboring countries. China must maintain its party rule and continue to succeed in its economy, but fears that outside forces will invade its system if it does not impose its own values. If China wants to expand its influence, one of the first targets is Korea, and then we must compromise sovereignty and values. Democracy is a very precious value achieved through the blood and tears of Koreans. However, it is difficult for China to admit this. If we admit this, what will happen to China’s Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang Uyghur policies? Korea needs hedging (risk distribution). While utilizing a country with similar values ​​and alliances to ours, in that extension, we established solidarity with Japan, Russia, Southeast Asia, Australia (Australia), and the European Union to strengthen the background, and in such a position, we are friendly and good without conflict with China. You have to try to grow the relationship.”

—In addition to the Democracy Summit announced by the Biden administration, the Quad Plus (plan to contain China by expanding the quad, a security consultative body in the US, Japan, India and Australia), and the Huawei issue, South Korea What decision should I make? “For example, if the US wants to pull us toward 3 o’clock and China’s 9 o’clock, Korea must continue to make policy decisions with the coordinates between 1 and 1:30 in mind. Several countries, including Japan, Australia and Singapore, are doing so now. Because we don’t have such a constant direction, we are pulling us strongly on both sides. Whether liberal or conservative, once we have decided on a direction, we must move constantly. For example, Korea should go to a meeting inviting Korea, Australia and India to the G7 or to a democracy summit. Instead of worrying or trying to avoid it, you should participate and find the role of Korea in it. For the Quad Plus, there is room for Korea to do so. The US, India, Australia, and Japan participating in the quad also have different positions. India, for example, is trying to get along well with China, but it doesn’t just hold hands with the United States because it thinks it needs to respond to a certain move in China. While Korea participates in a conference or Quad Plus that expands the G7, anti-China solidarity can play a role in creating order and norms for peace and stability in East Asia and for common prosperity.” —What principles should we adhere to regarding Korea-China relations? “Thirty years have passed since diplomatic relations between Korea and China, but there is no clear public policy for us. As exchange and cooperation increased and the trade surplus was growing, Korea-China relations were considered good as long as they were left alone. As a result, however, the risky degree of dependence on China grew, and in the end, a strong country had leverage and suffered the THAAD crisis. Looking back on the lessons of the THAAD incident, North Korea’s nuclear missiles are a vital understanding of security for us, but from the beginning, China made a frame saying’Never enter the US’s MD’, and we promised not to enter. From the beginning, it should have been said that this is a security issue for our country and that the high-altitude missile defense system (THAAD) was introduced according to our needs in order to defend the metropolitan area from North Korean missiles. When a debate broke out between conservatives and liberals over’whether to join the MD of the United States or not’, military commanders and diplomats avoided the problem. Eventually, when the United States said they would buy and deploy, it became an issue of deployment by the United States, and China protested more. Following the problem, the Park Geun-hye administration allowed the deployment, and China retaliated against South Korea. The second problem is that we responded on stage after China’s retaliation. A statement was also made, and unjust economic retaliation had to be discussed in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Boao Forum. When things like THAAD retaliation happen, we must move away from China. Then China realizes,’If we press, Korea is getting farther away.’ You can be active and return to the original position once the problem is resolved. However, as a result of not doing so, the retaliation of THAAD has not yet ended, and China claims that it has never retaliated. There is no such tragedy.” —But, in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, shouldn’t the relationship between Korea and China be kept close? “The North Korean nuclear issue and the Korean Peninsula issue cannot be resolved without the help of China. China also opposes that the North Korean nuclear issue poses a threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula, security in Northeast Asia, and the international nuclear non-proliferation system. However, China has another geopolitical issue. Without North Korea, we are concerned that US forces will face the Chinese border. So, China continues to pursue two rabbits: the North Korean nuclear issue and geopolitics. It is our task to reduce the geopolitical considerations of China and to make it more non-proliferation and toward peace in Northeast Asia. The North Korean nuclear issue is a vital and vital issue for South Korea. We are the country that most respects China’s core interests. But how much did China help us to understand life and life? If we endure that much in the retaliation of THAAD, will China evaluate it? no. In international relations, such responses are not evaluated. It moves dynamically, responds to the opponent’s hit, and the other side has to cooperate, but we are not yet familiar with such diplomacy. I am grateful if you help me while pushing my core profits. As there is a high possibility that similar issues will continue to emerge in the future with respect to China, Korea should set its coordinates well and move dynamically. If China respects what we consider to be vital and vital issues, we should also do diplomacy in a way that considers China’s core interests.” —How to view North Korea’s nuclear relations and North Korean nuclear negotiations after the Biden administration appeared. “The Biden administration’s officials experienced North Korea during the Obama administration and have deep distrust of North Korea. There is also strong opposition to Trump. We have to think carefully about this, as we have promoted summit diplomacy with North Korea like Trump. There are prospects that the Biden administration will return to the Obama administration’s “strategic patience,” but not. The Obama-Biden side made a dialogue effort, including sending the CIA director and deputy director to North Korea, but I don’t think North Korea has responded, and I don’t think they have done anything. Some are paying attention to the’ferry process’ led by Perry, who was the North Korean policy coordinator during the Clinton administration, but it is not appropriate to refer to the situation in which North Korea conducted six nuclear tests and advanced missile capabilities. The Biden administration will abandon its goal of denuclearization and will not go to disarmament or situation management. However, it is possible to come up with a plan to reduce the North Korean threat by denuclearization as the final goal and nuclear disarmament as an intermediate step. However, even if the United States accepts the step-by-step solution that North Korea has been asking for, in order to prevent North Korea’s salami tactic (a tactic to maximize profits by subdividing the steps), the United States will clarify the final goal of denuclearization, make a roadmap and report it correctly. In addition, Biden will demand that denuclearization or reduction of nuclear missiles be made visible. Biden said at the presidential candidate debate that’if North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities are reduced, we can meet Kim Jong-un’. After meeting the summit three times, he criticized Trump for whether North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities had declined, and expressed his intention to hold a summit meeting if the contents that could reduce North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities are made through working-level negotiations. He wants to implement (front loading) as early as possible to reduce North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In the Singapore Agreement, North Korea agreed to build trust ahead of denuclearization, and trust has not been established between North America, so how can frontloading be done? There are very few contacts. The more difficult the situation is when North Korea is obsessed with the Singapore Agreement. The Singapore agreement was overturned in Hanoi as Trump eventually failed to implement it. Is it easy for Biden to listen to it? However, it is unclear whether Biden will deny the Singapore agreement. When I talked to Biden’s staff, some criticize the Singapore Agreement, while others say it should not be denied. Even if you don’t deny it, you don’t agree, so it’s highly likely to come up with a different proposal. The nuclear capacity reduction could be set as an intermediate step, but the final goal of denuclearization would remain. We must be wary of the possibility that North Korea will try to make the intermediate stage the final stage.” —In the end, the role of Korea is important. What kind of roadmap is it best for Korea to come up with the first button with the Biden administration? “Once the Biden administration enters, it should be recognized that there is a high possibility of a burdensome situation in three areas: North Korea’s nuclear weapons, China and the alliance. Biden will emphasize alliance and solidarity, and will suggest that the ROK and the US keep pace with all three issues. Until now, the Korean peninsula issue has been the way we try to get the US to follow as we beat. Biden would suggest that the US will faithfully play the role of the alliance, so South Korea should not go ahead and discuss the issue of North Korea. Since we are in the second half of our tenure, it is time to achieve the results of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula that we started. At that time, if North Korea provokes the United States and reaches out to an offer for dialogue in the South, it could be a very difficult option for South Korea. The way to solve the problem is to build an urgently good trust relationship with the Biden administration. Then, when North Korea’s proposal for inter-Korean relations comes, it goes smoothly. The urgent need is to figure out how the Biden administration sees the big picture of East Asian and Korean peninsula policies, and devise a plan to induce good feeling and trust in that composition. In the big picture, we need to make a composition so that we can help the United States and specifically reflect our ideas in a nuclear-free peace on the Korean Peninsula. If we don’t do this, the US won’t listen to our opinion. It is not an urgent need to connect with the Biden administration, but a policy. Developing compelling software is more important than the date of the summit.”

—It is expected that North Korea, who has repeatedly struggled with the inauguration of the Biden administration, will hold a party conference in January and reveal its strategic direction. What new game will North Korea play with Biden? “The possibility of provocation cannot be ruled out. From the perspective of North Korea, it is necessary to figure out how North Korea is interpreting the process that has gone through Singapore, Hanoi and Stockholm so far. North Korea said that the United States had agreed to Singapore and made a different voice in Hanoi, and told Stockholm to bring a new calculation method, but it would be said that it was not brought. North Korea warned that it would no longer be tied to a nuclear missile moratorium, but the United States did nothing, but Trump went away, and Biden is criticizing everything Trump has done. From the North Korean perspective, it will be raging. North Korea is the only country in the world to remain silent about the decision to elect Biden. In the past, North Korea launched a missile shortly after Obama took office in 2009. Considering this comprehensively, it should be judged that there is a possibility that North Korea may provocate. We or the United States should not say,’What will North Korea do because North Korea has always been provocative?’ We must actively move to prevent provocation. The Biden administration should not attempt to talk with North Korea after it has finished reviewing its policy toward North Korea. Instead of a grand dialogue right now, we need to quietly open a New York channel and start dialogue with North Korea, and give various signals, saying,’If you provoke it, it is difficult, and if you do not provoke, there is a way to negotiate.’ Another option is to quickly appoint a special representative for North Korea policy. The United States does it directly, and it must be done through China. Of course, Korea must work hard. Together, we must try to prevent provocation. If North Korea provokes it, it takes a considerable amount of time for the dust to settle, and for the remainder of the government’s term of office for a year and a half, it may flow without dialogue.” —What will happen to the North American negotiations if Biden’s security team rejects the top-down diplomatic achievements of the Trump era and focuses on working-level negotiations? “From 2018 to 2019, there was an atmosphere in Korea that there was no need for working-level negotiations between North Korea and the United States. There was extreme beautification for top-down and extreme disparity for bottom-up (practical negotiations). Now, if the Biden administration comes in and says’no need for a top down’, that’s also wrong. Top-down and working-level negotiations are complementary. There are many parts that don’t evaluate the Trump-style approach, but the political determination and bold will that Trump himself tried to discuss with North Korea is necessary. When it is ready for bottom-up working-level negotiations, the decision of the top leader is needed at some point. I want Biden to follow that part.” —The Foreign Affairs and Security Team of Biden’s administration says that the Iranian nuclear agreement is a model for the North Korean nuclear solution. What should be noted? “When Biden’s security team talks about the Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) as a good example, it is the form rather than the content. The United States, China, Britain, Russia, Germany, and France joined forces to persuade Iran. In the case of the six-party talks, the five countries work together to persuade North Korea. But for now, it is not easy because of the geopolitics of China and Russia. Looking back on the progress of the six-party talks, in the early days, China and Russia were more serious about the cause of denuclearization than they are now. There was a time when Kim Gye-gwan protested, saying,’What court is this?’ It meant why everyone became one and treated only North Korea as a defendant. Since then, the US-Russian and US-China relations have deteriorated, and both China and Russia have lowered their fidelity to the cause of denuclearization. Biden will try to boost this. North Korea has a different stage of nuclear development than Iran, such as six nuclear tests, and the Iranian nuclear agreement is a form of solving all at once with a single agreement, but there is also a difference that North Korea rejects this and continues to divide the stages. ” —What will happen to North Korea-China relations? “North Korea-China relations were at their lowest point until 2017, but from 2018, they were dramatically restored through the visit of Chairman Kim Jong-un. China’s implementation of sanctions against North Korea is also relaxed, which is favorable for North Korea. The variable is that if the Biden administration comes in and manages US-China relations rather than Trump, and asks to cooperate on denuclearization, Chinese President Xi Jinping may also try to create an area of ​​cooperation with the United States. If North Korea provokes in the meantime, China will have no choice but to agree with the Security Council sanctions. In such a situation, there is a possibility that North Korea’s opposition and relations between North Korea and China will show signs of friction. You need to watch.” —The relationship between Korea and Japan is difficult. Recently, Korea has proposed its own’solution’, but Japan is rejecting it. The emergence of the Biden government is also an important variable. How should the relationship between Korea and Japan be resolved? “Korea didn’t, but Japan refused. It is said that our proposal intends to implement the Supreme Court ruling in any form, and Japan will never accept that part. The Biden administration will put pressure on improving Korea-Japan relations, and the pressure will be greater on us than on Japan. Japan also knows this situation, so it will not yield. It is good for us to preemptively release before the Biden administration puts pressure. If this is done well, it could be a good thing for US-Korea relations in the early days of the Biden administration. However, considering the situation so far, it is difficult for the government to preemptively. I would like to propose a format for the government to entrust this issue to the bipartisan’Sage Council’ and follow the proposals from it. As long as the conference is in operation, further actions by Korea and Japan will cease, and a summit meeting between Korea and Japan will be held in the meantime, allowing Japan to lift export restrictions against Korea, and South Korea can trigger a virtuous cycle by dropping a complaint with the World Trade Organization .” —While the Biden administration emphasizes strengthening the alliance, many countries have doubts,’Can the declining United States continue to play a credible role in Asia?’ “In American history, there have been tidal and ebbs of repeated intervention and isolation. After the Second World War, after the United States became a superpower, it was an intervention all the time, but it is uncertain in the future as seen from the emergence of Trumpism. However, the rise of China is also uncertain. From the point of view of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, if the winner is certain, they can line up, but it will take a very long time. Therefore, most countries are trying to standardize solidarity to prevent the United States from easily getting out of the region. One of them is the TPP (Pacific Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement), which was debated by the United States and left the Trump administration, but it is in a phase to return to the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Pacific Rim Economic Partnership Agreement). The Indo-Pacific Strategy and Quad Plus are all the same. It is important for Korea to cope with the flow of the majority in order to survive the turmoil, and to get in there and play a good role. These solidarity organizations must be wise to avoid becoming anti-China solidarity. A huge entity with its own civilization and worldview like China does not change due to external pressure. You have to deal with it delicately while defending in solidarity outside, and you shouldn’t go to one side of the enemy. If you drive it, it cleans the inside and goes to the wrong extreme. Despite the conflict between the US and China, cooperation in overcoming the pandemic, climate change, denuclearization, etc., and Korea also plays a good role in these issues, finding a space for communication that can be beneficial in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and also helping to stabilize US-China relations. I hope.” —What can the Moon Jae-in administration have to do in the field of diplomacy and security during the remainder of his tenure? “I hope that the government that has been in power with the candlelight spirit will achieve results and succeed. I think that the candlelight public sentiment is an order of the times to innovate the overall state administration. First of all, I hope that it will become a government that initiates the reform of the diplomatic ecosystem. Next, there are many dichotomous discussions about international cooperation or ethnic cooperation in Korean society, but this is not an alternative problem. We hope that integrating the two factors will lay the foundation for Korean diplomacy. The coordinates and direction must be set between US and Chinese. The peace process on the Korean peninsula must be successful, but first of all, it must quickly create a strategy against the United States that can persuade the Biden administration.” Editorial Writer Park Min-hee [email protected]