“Biden’s era sanctions against North Korea, Yongbyon+α promise to ease”

On November 12, last year, President Moon Jae-in made the first phone call with Joe Biden. [연합뉴스]

President Moon Jae-in said at a New Year’s press conference on the 18th, “We are in the framework of the United Nations (North Korea) sanctions, and there are obstacles in which inter-Korean cooperation cannot be fully achieved.” It is in the same context as he said on April 27 of last year, “The reason we failed to implement the Panmunjom Declaration is because we failed to go beyond international restrictions.” The fact that the President compared sanctions to “disability” and “restrictions” clearly shows the government’s perception of the international community’s sanctions system against North Korea.
However, it is pointed out that this perception can reveal the difference between the Biden administration and the approach. Results of asking 34 experts from Korea, US, China and Japan Only one respondent said, “Even if there is no progress in North Korea’s denuclearization measures, the Biden administration could consider easing some sanctions to improve inter-Korean relations.”
If so, what level of denuclearization must be promised for the Biden administration to move? When the North Korean-U.S. summit in February 2019 ended with’Hanoi no deal’, when asked based on the position of both sides, Kim Jong-un suggested, “If it is the degree of denuclearization of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the Biden administration will consider easing some sanctions.” 8 respondents (23.5%) to Iran. On the other hand, President Donald Trump argued 19 respondents (55.9%) answered that “North Korea should promise’Yongbyon denuclearization +α’ (additional disclosure of hidden nuclear facilities, agreement on final denuclearization goals, or setting up an entire roadmap), and the Biden administration will consider easing some sanctions.” There were much more.

Graphic = Reporter Kim Kyung-jin [email protected]

Biden, who has criticized Trump’s policy toward North Korea, is interpreted to share the idea that sanctions are essential for inducing denuclearization. Myung-Hyun Ko, a senior research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said, “The Biden administration is expected to devise a gradual nuclear negotiation proposal based on the Obama administration’s nuclear negotiations with Iran. Here, sanctions are the most important negotiating tool. As a result, we will not abandon an important diplomatic leverage only for inter-Korean relations.” Sunghan Kim, Dean of Graduate School of International Studies, Korea UniversityBiden’s security team officials basically recognize that the discussion of denuclearization without a nuclear freeze is just a show. It is predicted that sanctions will be eased when denuclearization comes into view through freezing and setting a roadmap.”
Bruce Klinger, a senior researcher at the US Heritage Foundation, pointed out a real problem. “In fact, some of the sanctions on North Korea are related to nuclear and missile, and some have been imposed by North Korea for committing criminal activities such as money laundering.” It stipulates that it cannot be stopped or canceled.”
Li Chun-fu, deputy head of the Center for Korean Studies at Nankai University, said, “It is highly likely that the Biden administration will also recognize that the step-by-step approach is correct.” “Korea has implemented sanctions easing corresponding to progress in denuclearization, and We have to try to get started with the four-way dialogue mechanism.”

There were also concerns that the difference in perception of sanctions could eventually lead to a conflict between the ROK-US alliance. Evans Revere, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific “The issue of sanctions easing will become a key element of dispute between the Biden-Moon governments”Was diagnosed. “Sanctions are a key component of North Korea’s efforts to abandon its nuclear and missile programs, and should not be mitigated unless North Korea takes significant steps to reduce its nuclear weapons. “The United States has held this view for a long time, and the Biden administration will do the same.” He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for the George W. Bush administration, and as head of the South Korean section for the Bill Clinton administration as the Deputy Head of the North Korean Nuclear Negotiation Team.

Graphic = Reporter Kim Kyung-jin [email protected]

In this regard, when 34 experts asked about the issue that could reveal the biggest cause of conflict between the Moon Jae-in administration and the Biden administration, the first place was the’New Cold War between the US and China’ (26.9%), and the Moon Jae-in administration’s’improving inter-Korean relations. ‘Priority’ followed by 23.9%. It is believed that the contradictory beat due to the “speeding” of inter-Korean relations is a big concern, second only to the strategic conflict between the US and China, which is a perceptual change in the international dynamics.
Also, at a press conference on the 18th, President Moon described the 2018 Trump-Kim Jong-un Singapore agreement as a “excellent agreement” and hoped the Biden administration would succeed, but the prospects of experts were cautious. The Biden administration questioned the possibility of inheriting the Singapore agreement on a 10-point scale (0 is’completely rejected’, 10 is’completely inherited’), with an average score of 4.6. There were 13 respondents who chose the median score of 5, with 13 respondents who will not succeed (1-4 points), and 8 respondents who will succeed (6-8 points). It can be interpreted as being a bit negative or a lot of perspectives as a matter to watch carefully.

How long will the Biden administration inherit the Trump policy? Graphic = Reporter Jaemin Shin [email protected]

Regarding this, Professor Park In-hui of the Department of International Studies at Ewha Womans University said, “The Moon Jae-in administration, in its fifth year in office, will try to lower the threshold of sanctions against North Korea. To achieve success, It is important. North Korea will have to make the same level of demands as the US.”
Jin Hee-gwan, a professor at Inje University’s Department of Unification, said, “The key is how much relative autonomy can our government have. If we only represent the interests of the United States, the improvement of inter-Korean relations will be far off.” Bi Yingda (畢潁達), associate professor of the Department of International Politics and Economics, Northeast Asian Academy of Northeast Asia, said, “The US position that places great importance on sanctions will not change, but the Moon Jae-in administration must continue diplomacy with the United States and make efforts to expand the space for inter-Korean relations.” Said.
Opinions were divided on the joint training between the US and Korea. 44.1% of respondents said that the Biden administration would be able to reduce or postpone the scale of training to maintain dialogue engines, 20.6% of respondents that they would want to restore the scale to the previous level and carry out as scheduled, and 35.3% of others. Most of the respondents who chose other premise that “it may vary depending on whether North Korea is provocative or not” or “the principle is restoration to its original state, but training in March this year may be reduced due to variables such as Corona 19 and management of the situation at the beginning of the term.” I put it.
In this regard, Shin Seong-ho, a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University, predicted that, like Iran, the Biden administration will seek a solution through negotiations with North Korea, and will have a flexible approach to coalition training within the scope of not harming the foundation of the alliance. did.
Lee Shin-hwa, a professor at the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Korea University, said, “The availability and scale of joint training in March this year can be an important test bed for the US-Korea alliance in the Biden era.” If so, the alliance will weaken and it will be difficult to achieve results of improving inter-Korean relations.”
Special Report Team Reporters Chul-Jae Lee, Ji-hye Yoo, Jin-woo Jung, and Hyun-Joo Park, correspondents in Beijing, Washington, Tokyo = Shin Kyung-jin, Park Hyun-young, and Lee Young-hee [email protected]