0 out of 34 experts in “Biden, vague respect for Korea between the US and China”

On the first day of his inauguration, President-elect Joe Biden decided to sign an executive order to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement. This is to give the world a message that “the United States is back” by trying to normalize through’Erase Trump’ in the field of diplomatic and security. However, experts predicted that different aspects could unfold in public policy.

34 experts were asked on a case-by-case basis whether the Biden administration would inherit the Trump administration’s policies. Questioned on a 10-point scale (0 points will be’completely rejected’, 10 points will be completely inherited). A succession score of 8.1 points for the’Quad (participating in the United States, Japan, Australia, India) Security Council Initiative’Was very high. A succession score of 7.7 points for the’Clean Network Initiative’ to withdraw Chinese-made equipment such as Huawei from the 5G communication network.It’s done. This means that the large framework of the policies the Trump administration has devised to pressure China is likely to take similarly.

Kang Joon-young, a professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Graduate School of International Studies, said, “It is highly likely that the Biden administration will not have a one-on-one composition of’US vs. China’ like Trump, but a new norm led by the US and pursue a'(US-centered) international society vs. China’ structure . “There can be a lot of things that will trouble Korea, which has no choice but to be conscious of China.”
In fact, Korea has virtually maintained a strategic ambiguity between the US and China without participating in the Quad and Clean Network. I asked experts what the Biden administration’s position was 0 people responded that “we will respect Korea’s decision as it is”.
While all of them agreed that they would require South Korea to contribute to its role as an alliance, The opinions of “Even if Korea does not respond sufficiently, there will be no strong pressure” (13 people, 40.6%) and that “if Korea’s contribution is not enough, strong pressure can be applied” (16 people, 50.0%). Ground similarly. It remains to be seen what kind of’biden’s request to join’ will be.
Regarding this, Shin Beom-cheol, director of the Center for Foreign Affairs and Security at the Economic and Social Research Institute, said, “The conflict between the US and China has already entered the stage of competition for supremacy, and Korea is no exception.” “The government needs to turn to join the Quad or Clean Network. There are, but it would be desirable to sign up slowly while watching the situation.”

Dongseo University Chair Professor Shin Jeong-seung said, “Biden-elect, who has rich experience in international relations and prefers a sophisticated diplomatic method, is likely to have more flexibility in pressure on China and limited to limited areas.” It would be desirable to speak out and promote national interests by participating in the international cooperation network of Korea.”
In order to end the conflict between South Korea and China due to the deployment of the high-altitude missile defense (THAAD) system in October 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration has not considered the so-called’three dollar position’ (not considering additional deployment of THAAD, and the US-led missile defense net). It was not incorporated into the system and did not develop into a military alliance between Korea, the US, and Japan). One respondent said, “The Biden administration will support the $3 position.” 15 respondents (45.5%) answered “I respect the position, but will see Korea as inclined to China”, and 4 (12.1%) answered “will disagree or demand withdrawal”.
There were 13 respondents (39.4%) who chose the guitar. It should not be a problem unless THAAD is additionally deployed (3 people), considering the US-ROK relations, there should be no pressure (3 people), and in fact, ask for measures that could lead to a change of position or withdrawal of US$3 position (4 people) ), etc.

In this regard, Woo Jung-yeop, head of the American Research Center at the Sejong Institute, said, “It was initially deployed to respond to the North Korean nuclear threat. “There is a possibility that the Biden administration will not mention China, but will argue that the issue of THAAD upgrade should be discussed with the cause of’we must respond to the advancement of North Korean weapons systems.’ “The already installed THAAD system is one of the advantages of the board against China,” said Yeo Seok-ju, former head of the Defense Ministry’s policy department. “We will not decide to withdraw or deploy additional deployments without meaningful changes in the situation, and discuss the agenda related to China with the Korean government. It is possible to use $3 as an appropriate means of pressure when doing so.”
Professor Han-kwon Kim of the National Academy of Foreign Affairs said, “It is true that Korea’s $3 position includes factors inconsistent with the US’s strategic interests and public pressure policy in the US-China strategic competition phase.” “There is a possibility that the pressure will follow.
There were also many opinions that the ambiguity between the US and China could be linked to another alliance issue, the issue of defense costs. With more than a year of vacancy in the ROK-US Defense Contributions Special Agreement (SMA), the Biden administration overwhelmingly answered that it would accept Korea’s last proposal, a 13% increase in the first year, and conclude negotiations with 27 out of 34. There were many.
Regarding this, Kim Yong-hyun, former Joint Chiefs of Staff Operations Headquarters, said, “Conflict over defense cost contribution will disappear, but there is a possibility that the U.S. will demand counter payments“It is sending a message to South Korea asking for a larger role as an alliance, and we need to read this carefully and set the direction.”
Some pointed out that the issue of the transition of wartime traditional control should be viewed in conjunction with the Biden administration’s popular strategy. President Moon Jae-in pledged to convert OPCON within his term of office, but none of the experts believed that this would be possible. Like the Trump administration, the Biden administration also responded with 26 (76.5%) responding that the position that meeting conditions rather than timing would be priority.

Kim Hyun-wook, a professor at the National Institute of Foreign Affairs, said, “The Biden administration is concerned about the situation after the transition to OPCON. “If China needs to be checked, and there are situations of concern such as nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-US allied forces led by the ROK military are not desirable.” Ken Goss, director of the US Naval Analysis Center (CNA), said, “The transition of optoelectronics could be a rush into an unknown domain that is too large for the security of the Korean Peninsula. I think it would be nice. “If we can convince the Biden administration to lead the way to engage in North Korea, this could in turn lead to a reduction in the burden of the Biden administration in the field of foreign affairs and security.”

Special Report Team Reporters Chul-Jae Lee, Ji-hye Yoo, Jin-woo Jung, and Hyun-Joo Park, correspondents in Beijing, Washington, Tokyo = Shin Kyung-jin, Park Hyun-young, and Lee Young-hee [email protected]