[중앙시평] North Korea has no will to denuclearize

The Biden administration’s policy on the Korean Peninsula, especially in response to the North Korean nuclear issue, is drawing attention. How much energy to devote to North Korea policy will be determined by policy priorities, the level of acceptance of the security guarantees required by North Korea, and whether China’s cooperation to persuade North Korea is secured. However, the priority of the United States is not as high as expected, the number of cards that can be played is limited, and there seems to be little room for compromise with China, which is in a strategic conflict.

The Obama administration, which can be seen as the predecessor of the Biden administration, was evaluated for being passive rather than active resolution of international disputes. Examples include “strategic patience” for the North Korean nuclear program, as well as response to China’s construction of an artificial island in the South China Sea and Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula. There are fewer tools available to the United States now than then. It declares “The United States is back”, but there are also concerns about “Obama Season 2”. Four years later, it seems that Korea will have a hardened North Korean nuclear weapons in its head.

South Korea is the country in which new attempts to respond to the North Korean nuclear program are more urgent. Nevertheless, the government repeatedly said, “North Korea’s willingness to denuclearize is firm on the premise of security guarantees.” The government must first clarify what North Korea refers to as’denuclearization’ and’security guarantee’. Otherwise, if only’North Korea’s will to denuclearize’ is emphasized, it is only’part of the truth’. It can be worse than lies.

North Korean leaders and negotiators have argued that’the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the reign of President Kim Il-sung’. In summary, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula means the removal of nuclear umbrellas from both the South and the North, politically to lift sanctions, establish diplomatic relations with the North and the United States, economically to support reconstruction, and militarily to withdraw US forces in Korea.

First of all, we need to see if these conditions can be met. The establishment of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States and lifting of sanctions can be carried out in line with the abolition of nuclear weapons. Economic support can also be promoted by Korea. However, the USFK issue goes beyond North Korea’s security guarantee. This is because it will lead to a devastating shift in Northeast Asia and the world order beyond the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, when the government obtains explicit consent from North Korea for the existence of US troops in Korea, it proves that it has a firm determination to denuclearize, and nuclear negotiations are simplified.

However, North Korea consistently opposes the development of US strategic assets on the Korean Peninsula and demands the withdrawal of US troops. Believing that denuclearization and peace will be achieved by scrutinizing North Korea, which is proposing unsatisfactory conditions, is the same as believing that a sailor rowing the North Star as a coordinate will actually reach North Korea.

In the past, when North Korea was in the nuclear development stage, it was expected to control its pace through negotiations. However, North Korea passed the threshold of nuclear powers at the end of 2017. The edition has changed as much as before and after’The Garden of Eden’. Faced with this, Biden’s team set the North Korean nuclear program as a target for reduction rather than abolition before taking office. There is a possibility that the United States will use its experience in negotiations with Iran in 2015 to manage North Korea’s nuclear weapons in a four- or six-party manner. North Korea, which has completed its nuclear program, is very different from Iran, which is attempting a nuclear program. Before the situation of South Korea under the North Korean nuclear program becomes more shabby, options must be expanded.

First, the phase of negotiations must be changed drastically. On the premise of North Korea’s complete nuclear abandonment, it is necessary to boldly accept the conditions of political and economic security, excluding the USFK issue. Nevertheless, if you refuse to destroy nuclear weapons, you are accumulating justification for the next step of action.

Second, it is necessary to establish a nuclear sharing plan to strengthen the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella. It also includes the establishment of the Asian version of the’Nuclear Planning Group’. Of course, even if the tactical nucleus is rearranged, as in the case of NATO, the final key is the United States, so there is a limit. Still, it has a symbolic effect.

Third, it is to create conditions for its own nuclear capability. Instead of developing nuclear weapons right away, you should have it as an option after all means. The firewall is thin between the nuclear civil and military use. Soil composition is needed, such as fostering scientists and promoting research. Japan and Germany are under the U.S. nuclear umbrellas, yet have thick nuclear manpower, reprocessing and high concentration facilities, respectively. It means a lot. It is not the right direction for Korea to dismantle facilities and reduce the research environment through a nuclear power plant campaign.

Maintaining South Korea’s nuclear options will increase its negotiating position as a party, and stimulate the North Korean-US negotiating posture and China’s persuasion toward North Korea. It is also important to the nation’s ethos as a’security adult’ who takes responsibility for their own safety. These expanded options are not mutually exclusive but complementary. A parallel strategy is required to make a big game while negotiating.

The current government’s policy toward North Korea seemed to be driven by hubris that this time was different, euphoria that the South and North could unite with national sentiment, and amnesia that did not face the records of failure. Often these overlapping mental states are called’dangerous combinations’. What the government should do in the remainder of the period is to move away from this mix and strive to expand the options Korea should go.

Minsoon Song, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade