[전문] ‘The Age of Biden’ Maekyung Diplomatic and Security Experts Special Discussion

With the inauguration of President Biden on the 20th, the “unfamiliar United States” is expected to end and the “familiar United States” will return. But just because you’re used to it isn’t comfortable. The homework was left to adapt to the changed grammar faster.

Seoul National University Emeritus Professor Yoon Young-gwan (former Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade), former Foreign Minister Yoon Byeong-se, and Seoul National University visiting professor (Former Head of the Korean Peninsula Peace and Bargaining Headquarters, Russian Ambassador to Russia), who attended the Maeil Economic Daily’Special Discussion Meeting for Foreign Affairs and Security Experts’ in writing. He stressed that we must revise our diplomatic and security strategy that worked in the Trump era and respond proactively.

Seoul National University Emeritus Professor Yoon Young-kwan, who served as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the participatory government in 2003, said, “We must persuade us not to try to operate the ROK-US alliance in the same way as countries such as Australia and Japan without geopolitical specificity, but to move on to a’customized alliance strategy. “Do it” he advised.

Former Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, who holds the record of the longest-supplied foreign minister, said, “President Biden is an era where’responsible response’ is important,” and pointed out that “Before persuading an issue of interest, you must first show the’likeness of alliance’.”

Lee Sang-rak, the former head of the Korean Peninsula Peace Bargaining Headquarters, who recently published his book, criticized that it is important to have a great principle amid the intensifying conflict between the United States and China. “If the United States pulls from the 3 o’clock position and China’s 9 o’clock, we should be around 1:30.” .

-With President Biden’s inauguration, what is the first priority for our diplomacy?

Yeong-Kwan Yoon: It is important to establish close communication channels with policy makers appointed to senior positions in the Biden administration. The summit meeting should be held as soon as possible to lay the groundwork for bilateral cooperation. Strategic consideration will be needed on what message the ROK will deliver to the US at the summit.

The Biden administration has a lot of urgent domestic issues such as resolving the Corona 19 crisis, saving the economy, social integration, and domestic reform tasks. In that case, we do not know how much North Korea will restrain provocations and wait. The Biden administration must persuade the North to deliver a positive message about negotiations with North Korea as soon as possible. It would be nice if Kurt Campbell, US White House National Security Council (NSC) Indo-Pacific Coordinator, could play a role in this.

Yun Byeong-se: It should be noted that the Foreign Affairs and Security Team of the Biden administration has shown a critical view of the Trump administration’s policy on the Korean Peninsula. It is important to instill a strong belief from the outset that Korea will become a reliable alliance partner as well as Japan, Australia and the former conservative governments of Korea.

In particular, it is also important not to do’what you shouldn’t do’. As at the first summit between former President Kim Dae-jung and George W. Bush in 2001, we tried to lecture our position on North Korea issues, or our high-ranking officials first raised the issue of rebalancing alliance relations before and after the inauguration of the participatory government in 2003. When it comes to buying, you will be in the wrong place from the first button.

Moon Moon: In a situation where the Democratic Party’s disgust to the point of impeaching President Trump again has reached its peak, it is unlikely that we will have a good feeling for what we have done with President Trump. The Biden administration will emphasize the alliance and emphasize a coordinated approach between the ROK and the United States. As the demands of the Biden administration can approach the public response, the ROK-US alliance, and the North Korean nuclear issue like a’triple wave’, our space of communication can be reduced.

Our urgent need is to closely grasp Biden’s East Asian and Korean peninsula policies, and then come up with countermeasures that will induce the favor of the Biden administration on the basis of that. It is better to cooperate with the United States first in a large composition and then persuade the Korean Peninsula issue. Rather than trying to push our thinking right away with high-level contact, we need to come up with an attractive policy first. The message to be delivered comes first, and the channel to be delivered is the next problem.

-Biden’s administration officials are evaluated as being similar to the past to the extent that they are called’Obama 3.0′. Do you think the policy toward North Korea will also return to’strategic patience’?

Young-Kwan Yoon: The background of the Barack Obama administration’s “strategic patience” was North Korea’s preemptive and aggressive nuclear tests and missile launches several times. For example, the North Korean side dismissed expectations of a North Korean nuclear solution through dialogue with the second nuclear test and missile launch immediately after President Obama took office in May 2009. On February 29, 2012, shortly after the agreement between the United States and North Korea, it launched a long-range missile in March, beating the expectations of the United States. After the third nuclear test in May 2013, the Obama administration almost gave up, which led to “strategic patience.”

However, the current North Korean government has been cautiously watching and withholding nuclear tests and long-range missile launches after the agreement with the Trump administration in Singapore in 2018. Since the situation is different from then, just because the characters are similar does not necessarily mean returning to’strategic patience’.

Elect Biden believes that the United States cannot solve many difficult international problems on its own, and values ​​cooperation with the alliance. In order to solve the North Korean nuclear issue, it is necessary to provide economic support and security guarantees in exchange for denuclearization, but since the United States cannot do it alone, it is possible to seek a frame of multilateralism. In particular, during the Obama administration, it was the current White House National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, who directly participated in working-level negotiations on the Iran Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) and achieved a compromise.

However, even in a multilateral form, negotiations between the US and North Korea will inevitably play a leading role, so the Korean government should also prepare for this possibility.

Yoon Byung-se: As seen in Biden’s “Kim Jong-un Thug” remarks and US Secretary of State Tony Blinken’s “Kim Jong-un Tyrant” remarks, the Biden administration’s nominees perceived the North Korean leader and the North Korean regime extremely negatively. There is this. Therefore, as long as there is no progress in denuclearization, it is expected to maintain the stance of pressure policies such as continuing sanctions against North Korea.

However, in the sense that the North Korean nuclear threat, which is in the final stage of completion, cannot be neglected, it will continue to open up the possibility of dialogue and negotiations along with the maintenance of sanctions. In this case, it is highly likely that the Iranian nuclear negotiation model, which Blinken nominee has already referred to as the “best model,” will be the subject of major review.

For Korea, efforts should be made to maximize the strengths of the multilateral negotiation framework and supplement the shortcomings. However, in light of the preference for the Iranian model, it should be warned that the Biden administration may try to focus on managing the mid- to long-term situation rather than completely denuclearizing North Korea.

Moon Moon: Biden-elect’s officials had a lot of experience negotiating with North Korea during the Bill Clinton and Obama administrations. The strong point of expertise is that it is an advantage, but the disadvantage is that it will not be easy for the Korean government to persuade the Korean government because they know North Korea well and have a deep negative perception of North Korea.

Strategic patience is a term Biden doesn’t admit and dislike. Therefore, it will not go back to the past and will pursue policies aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. Considering the reality, we will accept a step-by-step approach, but we will try to clarify our final goal so as not to be abused by North Korea and make a working-level negotiation to accelerate meaningful denuclearization measures.

Regarding the negotiation framework, Biden-elect emphasizes China’s responsibility and role. Like the Iranian model, it is possible to draw a picture of the denuclearization of the parties around the Korean peninsula and North Korea by creating a 5:1 composition.

However, it is unlikely that North Korea will respond to these US proposals, as North Korea is obsessed with the success of the US-North Korea summit in Singapore and obsessed with discussions between the leaders and a gradual “denuclearization after building trust in the first place. What we are wary of is that when the United States proposes a nuclear reduction plan as an intermediate stage of denuclearization, North Korea transforms it as if it were its final goal.

-Recently, there have been frequent criticisms in Korea and in the US in Joya. What will the ROK-US alliance look like after the inauguration of President Biden?

Young-Kwan Yoon: The focus of alliance diplomacy between the ROK and the United States will change considerably. During the Trump administration, the main concern was economic gain, or money. So, the issue of the defense cost share became a challenge, and the issue of democracy and alliance was left behind. Also, as President Trump’s remarks on the withdrawal of US troops in Korea, it was not clear how important he values ​​the ROK-US alliance, which instilled anxiety in our people.

The Biden administration, on the other hand, values ​​democracy and alliances. As a democratic alliance, it would be a good idea to move forward in a cooperating attitude, as the core concern will be how much Korea will co-support with the United States. If “D10” (the Democratic Ten-nation Alliance), which Campbell’s recently mentioned, becomes a reality, it is desirable for Korea to respond.

Yoon Byung-se: Under the Biden administration, it will greatly ease the burden on the issue of the defense cost share led by President Trump and the reduction of US forces in Korea. On the other hand, the transition of wartime power, combined military training with the US, strengthening security cooperation between the US and Japan, and the demand for participation in the anti-China solidarity’quad’ can be factors of conflict.

We maintain the’Alliance’ that shares common values ​​and visions, such as democracy, market economy, and compliance with international codes of conduct, while faithfully playing the role of the core axis (lynchpin) of peace and security in the Asia Pacific region, such as sharing and responding to the North Korean nuclear threat. I have to go out.

Furthermore, in order to offset the’nuclear hostage situation’, an existential security threat arising from North Korea’s accelerating nuclear armament, it is necessary to discuss strategies with the US side, such as forward deployment of expansion deterrent.

Sang-Rak Moon: Biden is calling for the restoration of US leadership and will be calling for a’responsible response’ from allies. Therefore, Biden is likely to be less patient than President Trump for South Korea’s independent actions, and friction will arise if negotiations are not satisfactory in North Korea, China, and Korea-Japan relations.

It will be difficult for the government to resist the US demand for more solidarity with South Korea in response to China. It is desirable to preemptively dissolve the worsened relationship with Japan before pressure from the US comes.

Regarding the North Korean issue, the ROK-US combined military training scheduled for March is a problem. If the Biden administration decides to train, North Korea will respond with provocations, which is likely to intensify controversy between the ROK and the United States. The defense cost issue will be relatively easy to deal with, but Biden’s administration, an alliance-oriented administration, may object to the operation of THAAD (high-altitude missile defense system), the role of the UNC, and the return of OPCON.

-Recently, concerns have been raised in the international community over the government’s anti-North Korean warfare laws. Korea is being criticized as a “anti-human rights state”, how should we respond?

Young-Kwan Yoon: It is by no means desirable for Korea to be recognized as an anti-human rights state by the Biden administration, which values ​​democracy and human rights. This would also disrupt other diplomatic goals we pursue, such as the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. Efforts should be made to ensure that the country is recognized as a country that respects the norms and principles generally respected by the international community.

In that context, we need to inform that North Korean human rights can be improved as the connection with the international community increases and deepens. For example, in the early 1970s, the improvement of human rights in countries in Eastern Europe occurred after the improvement of relations between the East and the West and the progress of the engagement policy called the Helsinki Process, and that China’s human rights issue improved after the engagement policy of the US administration of Richard Nixon. It is to make the dots understand. In the case of North Korea, it is also necessary to persuade that the improvement and development of political relations between the US and North Korea along with the promotion of denuclearization can bring substantial human rights improvement.

Yun Byeong-se: It is probably the first case since Korea was democratized that the international community such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and the United Nations are expressing concerns about the legislation. This is a series of disappointments that the South Korean government showed in the process of responding to the murder of an official of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in the West Sea last September, when the South Korean government did not participate in the joint proposal of the UN Resolution on Human Rights in North Korea for the second consecutive year, forcibly repatriated North Korean sailors in 2019. I don’t think it’s irrelevant to the attitude of a rash.

The seriousness of how the international community, including the United States, will react if the law against North Korea’s anti-spreading of warfare is passed can be expected. We should have taken measures to avoid incurring unnecessary national costs in advance, but it is regrettable that such a system within the government did not work.

In the past authoritarian era, it is necessary to consider the areas to be improved even now, taking lessons from the fact that the Korean government defended the anti-human rights policy and paid enormous costs, such as the withdrawal of US troops in Korea. Otherwise, it will be a heavy burden on attending the US-led Global Democracy Summit, which is expected to be held this year, and the US State Department’s annual human rights report also contains negative opinions about Korea and may be distributed around the world.

In particular, if a hearing is held by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Committee of the US House of Representatives sooner or later, it could be a day of shame when the human rights policy of the Korean government is discussed in the US Congress after more than 40 years, and in some cases, additional measures are followed.

Satellite Rock: It would have been nice if we had carefully considered aspects related to human rights violations and reactions from the international community before the law was created. From now on, it is necessary to reduce the possession of books by utilizing the grave of management. This issue should be dealt with so that it does not erode the trust and favor of the ROK-US nursing in the early days of the Biden administration.

-Recently, the Korean-Japanese relations are freezing even further as the Korean court ruled that the Japanese government compensate the victims of Japanese military comfort women. Do you expect Biden-elect to act as a mediator in bilateral relations after taking office?

Young-Kwan Yoon: Biden’s administration is likely to actively intervene to improve Korea-Japan relations. “As both Korea and Japan are allies and democratic states of the United States, let’s move forward in the future.” This is because the US strategically puts pressure on China in mind. In particular, it is predicted that Campbell coordinators will play an important role in this regard.

In Korea-Japan relations, the problem of past history has gone beyond a legal approach and is now at the stage of seeking a political and diplomatic solution. In the mid to long term, if we continue to drag the relationship between Korea and Japan in a deteriorating state, what we lose will be greater than what we gain.

Yun Byeong-se: The Biden administration, which promoted the restoration of alliance diplomacy in the midst of intensifying conflict between the United States and China, is reducing the need for strengthening cooperation between Korea, the United States, and Japan more than during the Obama administration.

Biden is a person who played a significant role in concluding the comfort women agreement and the conclusion of Jisomia (Korea-Japan Military Information Protection Agreement), so you will feel frustrated that the relationship between Korea and Japan has deteriorated to the worst ever. Blinken’s nominee is also a person who places great importance on trilateral diplomatic and security cooperation, such as serving as deputy secretary of the State Department in the 2nd Obama administration, creating strategic dialogues at the level of the vice ministers of Korea, the United States, and Japan, and holding them two or three times a year.

Thus, the Biden administration will not stand on the sidelines of the worst relationship between the two most important allies in Asia since diplomatic relations.

Moon Moon: The Biden administration will encourage the restoration of relations, but the pressure will be more on the Korean side. This is because, internationally, Japan’s arguments in terms of procedures and forms are viewed as more convincing. If pressure from the United States increases, Korea will be forced to drag. Therefore, biden’s trust can be gained by preemptively solving problems rather than waiting.

I would like to propose a plan for the government to request a solution by organizing a’second party civil wise men’s meeting’. First, it is possible to think of a method of halting additional measures such as cashing Japanese companies’ seized assets and then holding a summit meeting between Japan and Japan to simultaneously withdraw Japanese export control measures and the World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint.

-There are many concerns that the US-China conflict will intensify this year as the 100th anniversary of the inauguration of the US President and the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. What countermeasures should our diplomacy come up with?

Young-Kwan Yoon: It’s a prudent approach to rushing in such a way that you have to choose one way or another. There are countless other countries that depend on China for the economy and the US for security. It is necessary to be more cautious from the standpoint of Korea, who lives with geopolitical specificity and North Korea issues at its head. And neither is the decisive moment of giving up the alliance or paying huge economic losses. In diplomacy, timing always matters.

First of all, we need to be sure to recognize that our commitment to the ROK-US alliance is firm. It is necessary to say that under such a preemptive system, we will develop the ROK-US alliance, taking full consideration of the geopolitical specificity of the Korean Peninsula and unstable North Korean variables. Instead of trying to run the ROK-US alliance in the same way as countries like Australia and Japan, which have no geopolitical specificity, we must persuade them to move on to a’customized alliance strategy’. China needs to make it clear that we will cooperate with the United States on the level of national identity as a democratic state.

Yun Byeong-se: The key is to maintain the principle and center of developing a partnership between Korea and China based on the US-ROK alliance. Balanced diplomacy or equidistant diplomacy does not fit this principle.

However, as the areas of conflict between the US and China are becoming more complex, it is necessary to establish their own standards and separate the areas related to the core interests and values ​​of the alliance and those that are not, and manage them appropriately so that there is no conflict of interest. In addition, it would be good to share wisdom and countermeasures by establishing a cooperative system with allies such as Australia, ASEAN, and the EU, which have been or are expected to receive retaliation from China.

For us, it will be a great task to bring out cooperation between the US and China to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and to overcome the opposition from North Korea and China at the same time as leading the forward deployment of US expansion deterrent force.

If Chinese President-elect Xi Jinping visits Korea prior to the ROK-US summit meeting with Biden, this will give a very negative signal to the US, so be careful.

Satellite Lock: The important thing is to be on the lookout for situations that will compromise sovereignty and independence. We must be wary of China’s great nationalism and the psychology of restoring the Chinese order, but that does not completely stand on the side of the United States. This is because when considering geopolitical and economic relations, it is necessary to maintain good relations with China.

Therefore, we should not choose the US or China, but our coordinates and directions. Assuming that the US pulls us at 3 o’clock and China pulls us at 9 o’clock, we have to choose a coordinate around 1 o’clock or 1:30 o’clock. If China shows excessive behavior, it needs a dynamic response such as moving to 2 o’clock and returning when the problem is resolved.

[정리 = 한예경 기자 / 안정훈 기자]
[ⓒ 매일경제 & mk.co.kr, 무단전재 및 재배포 금지]