[외교 원로 특별좌담] ‘Biden will not change the goal of’denuclearization of North Korea’…

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With the official inauguration of US President Joe Biden, not only the US, but also the inter-Korean, North Korean, South Korean-Chinese, and Korean-Japanese relations all faced an inflection point. As the U.S. is expected to reorganize the world order centering on solidarity and alliance among liberal democratic camps in response to the totalitarian camp, escaping from the “isolationism” stance of former President Donald Trump, there are continuing criticism that our diplomatic and security strategy should also be significantly modified. . Accordingly, Seoul Economic Daily organized a special meeting for the elders of foreign affairs and security through written and telephone calls, and former Foreign Minister Yoon Byeong-se and former UN Ambassador Kim Sook for each foreign and security issue (currently, co-director of the Establishment of Pan-National Organization for Resolving Fine Dust), I heard the opinions of former Ambassador Shin Gak-soo and Kwon Young-se, a member of the National Power of the National Assembly (former Ambassador to China). The following are their views on US-North Korea relations.

△ North Korea even more strongly suggested its willingness to strengthen nuclear armed forces at the recent party conference. There is also a prospect that North Korea will eventually negotiate “nuclear disarmament” rather than “denuclearization” in the US. In what direction do you expect the Biden government’s policy toward North Korea to flow?

▶Kim-sook: It was also revealed that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons. It is calling for a nuclear disarmament negotiation with the United States. Among the experts on the Democratic Party of the United States, more and more people are advocating the so-called’interim agreement’ to deter nuclear capacity build-up because complete denuclearization is impossible. There are some conservative scholars who agree with this. In conclusion, however, the US government will not be able to eliminate terms aimed at the complete denuclearization of North Korea, such as’CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization)’ and’FFVD (final and fully verified denuclearization)’. If the target is relaxed, the problem of easing even the global nuclear non-proliferation regime will arise. In particular, it will give an impetus for nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. It makes no sense in reality that only North Korea, which is estimated to have only 60 to 80 nuclear weapons, will disarmament with Russia and China.

Iran-style nuclear agreements are being discussed, but Iran and North Korea have different stages of nuclear development and have different goals for possessing nuclear weapons. Iran held a multi-party talks of “5+1 (5 permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany)”, but did we not hold a six-party talks? When I attended the last North Korean nuclear talks in 2008 as chief representative of the six-party talks, there are limitations that I felt at the scene. The goal of denuclearization cannot be changed. On denuclearization, it is advisable that both sides of North America agree on a non-disagreeable rule and then create a step-by-step roadmap to implement it.

▶Shin Gak-soo: The Biden administration is expected to pursue a different negotiation method with the Trump administration. We will emphasize bottom-up working-level talks rather than top-down summits of the Trump administration, and seek concrete and enforceable agreements based on principles rather than abstract agreements. The major foreign and security policy makers of the Biden administration are those with extensive experience in negotiating with North Korea in the past, so it will not be easy to fall for North Korea’s tactics.

It is true that there are nuclear disarmament waves within the Biden government. Since the North Korean nuclear program is nearing completion, there is a high possibility that it will not give up. If North Korea is left as it is to complete its nuclear armament, there is also a risk that it will spread to other regions.

However, turning the negotiations to nuclear disarmament will focus on freezing and non-proliferation instead of easing sanctions. Complete denuclearization carries a high risk of ending in demise. Our government must make meticulous diplomatic efforts to block this possibility.

It will not be easy for the Biden administration to negotiate negotiating with the Trump administration because there is a line proposed in the Hanoi negotiations. It must include the creation of an overall roadmap for the implementation of denuclearization, complete reporting and verification systems, phasing out sanctions, and snapback (restore sanctions) in case of violation.

▶Yun Byeong-se: North Korea has long been considering nuclear disarmament negotiations based on’minimal deterrence’ while aiming for a global nuclear power and a nuclear power in the East. It is an extension of this that North Korea mentioned nuclear weapons 36 times at the 8th Party Congress, but did not say a word about the complete denuclearization of Singapore.

Regarding the direction of the Biden administration’s strategy on the North Korean nuclear issue, there are already big plans in the interviews and contributions of the Democratic Party Jeonggang and President Biden. Diplomacy with principle, constant pressure to denuclearize North Korea, close consultations with allies, utilization of multilateral cooperation, system diplomacy other than normal-led diplomacy, summit meetings only possible when North Korea’s nuclear capacity is reduced, containment of North Korean nuclear threats and suppression of regional provocations. . The Biden government will review North Korea policies over the next two to three months to develop strategic stance and policy options. In this process, we will also discuss with Korea and Japan.

In the event of negotiations with North Korea, I think we will primarily review ways to transform the Iranian model, which most of the new diplomatic and security teams were involved in, to suit the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In Korea, efforts should be made to maximize the strengths of the multilateral negotiation framework and complement the shortcomings. During the Iran nuclear negotiations and the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear program, bilateral talks were held frequently within the framework of multilateral negotiations.

The unprecedented international coordination of pressure on North Korea, led by the ROK and the United States during the second Obama administration, has been punctured in the past 2-3 years due to the US-North Korea summit and the close relationship between North Korea, China and Russia. The Biden administration is expected to continue to maintain and strengthen the framework of pressure in terms of alliance cooperation and strengthening multilateralism as long as there is no progress toward denuclearization.

▶Kwon Young-se: Secretary of State Tony Blincoln has announced that he will review North Korea policy. The Biden administration seems to be aiming for a bargaining that works, not a show bargaining. President Moon Jae-in said that the Singapore talks should be the starting point for North American renegotiation, but that’s in the wrong direction. First of all, it is necessary to observe the trend of reviewing the US policy toward North Korea.

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△ North Korea immediately placed an end to the ROK-US combined military training in March as a condition for improving inter-Korean relations. How do you expect the Biden administration to respond if the South Korean government is conscious of North Korea and promotes a reduction in ROK-US combined exercises?

▶Kwon Young-se: Recently, President Moon and the Ministry of Defense made clear the position that “we can discuss combined military exercises with North Korea”. It also announced that it will continue the implementation of the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement and carry out the second-stage verification and evaluation of the transition to wartime power within this year. However, they are silent about North Korea’s tactical nuclear or new submarine launch ballistic missile (SLBM) development orders. The only foreign diplomacy of the Moon Jae-in administration is toward North Korea. There is no willingness to change. If we disagree with the Biden administration in this way on the North Korean issue, the future is also uncertain.

▶Shin Gak-su: There is no reason to postpone or reduce the combined training in a situation where North Korea is engrossed in increasing nuclear power without responding to North Korean nuclear negotiations. It should proceed. An army without training weakens its combat power, leading to a loss of defense capability. The USFK is also very concerned about this. The issue of coalition training is basically a matter with the US, an ally, and will be decided through discussions between Korea and the United States.

We must firmly reject any action by North Korea attempting to interfere with the ROK-US alliance and the ROK-US combined defense system on the grounds of inter-Korean relations or nuclear negotiations. North Korea is interfering with our defense capabilities, augmenting its nuclear and conventional forces at will. Assisting this will lead to even greater interference.

During the Trump administration, the ROK and the United States temporarily suspended joint exercises for nuclear negotiations with North Korea. This would be possible if the ROK and the United States judge that they need to make adjustments to deter North Korean provocations and bring them into bargaining, but I don’t think that’s very likely right now.

▶Kim Sook: The problem was entangled when former President Trump suddenly referred to joint training as a’money-making war game’ at the Singapore conference. That was an insult to the ROK-US alliance. On the other hand, the US military emphasized the importance of combined training to the point that it was not necessary to stay in Korea unless training was resumed.

Misunderstanding seems to arise because the two Koreas have agreed to discuss the joint military training between the two Koreas through the Inter-Korean Military Joint Commission. However, North Korea is also conducting military exercises on its own. The Inter-Korean Joint Military Commission said that it would be discussed, but it didn’t even ban it. Moreover, the committee has never been put into operation. If the Korean government separately proposes to the Biden government to stop or reduce the joint training, I think the Biden government will not agree. It can be an act that amplifies doubts about the ROK-US alliance and undermines trust.

▶Yun Byeong-se: Even in the situation of a novel coronavirus infection (Corona 19), the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the US military conducted a large-scale joint military training’Kin Sword’ at the end of last year. This month, the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, and India even conducted a multinational anti-submarine drill with only us absent. In a severe situation where North Korea declared its nuclear and advanced armed forces to be strengthened, if only the ROK-US combined military exercises are stopped, it will inevitably disrupt the military readiness of the ROK-US alliance.

The cessation of joint exercises was a sudden and one-sided declaration by former President Trump at the Singapore talks without prior consultation. Meanwhile, North Korea has conducted large-scale military exercises and increased its nuclear and missile capabilities. Because of this, I believe the Biden administration is seriously considering resuming training.

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△ There is also a prospect that the North Korean issue will be subordinated to the Biden administration. Do you expect any progress in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, including the declaration of an end to the war during the remaining term of the Moon Jae-in administration?

▶Byeongse Yoon: The current government remembers the inter-Korean summit held at the end of the participatory government, so it seems that it will continue to make great efforts to advance the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. However, in light of the Biden administration’s critical stance that it will fully review the Trump administration’s approach to North Korea, it will be difficult to expect progress in denuclearization or improvement in US-North Korea relations that could drive progress in inter-Korean relations. This is especially true given the biden government’s position to take a’bottom-up’ approach, or the fact that the North Korean issue has not been on the top of the diplomatic and security issues to date. In the absence of progress in denuclearization, the possibility of raising US-North Korea relations through inter-Korean dialogue is slim.

However, nominee Blincoln indicated interest in humanitarian issues at the hearing. There is room for flexibility in the humanitarian field of the United States, without compromising sanctions.

▶Kwon Young-se: Currently, the issue of the Korean Peninsula or North Korea is not a top priority in the United States. The situation with China, which is competing for supremacy externally, is much more important. Domestically, there are many areas to overcome, such as Corona 19. As President Biden said, “It’s still alive,” Iran’s nuclear agreement is also an urgent matter. The peace process on the Korean Peninsula and the Singapore talks should basically leave only the philosophical stance that aims for peace with North Korea. Don’t force America. For example, it means that we should not insist on our thoughts even on the sidelines, such as easing sanctions against North Korea and the ROK-US combined military training (reduction and suspension).

▶Shin Gak-soo: The top priority of the Biden government is the numerous domestic issues such as responding to Corona 19, recovering the economy, and trying to deal with divided society. It is true that we do not have much time and effort to devote our time and effort to foreign matters.

However, the Biden administration will actively work to restore the status of the United States, which fell during the Trump era. The biggest problem is China, followed by the restoration of the Iranian nuclear agreement and the North Korean nuclear issue. If North Korea provokes, the Biden government’s response may be quicker, but at this time, there is a risk of tightening sanctions and becoming a kind of strategic patience.

The declaration of an end to the war is a wrong policy tool. Neither the US nor North Korea are interested. It doesn’t make any more sense. The peace process on the Korean Peninsula failed to achieve its intended results due to a strategic error that put inter-Korean relations ahead of the North Korean nuclear issue. I don’t think it is easy to make tangible progress within the term of President Moon.

North Korea has advanced inter-Korean relations only when it is worth utilizing South Korea’s access to the United States or obtaining economic cooperation and support. Since then, when the situation has changed, we have repeatedly reversed agreements and reversed outcomes. It must be made that North Korea pays a cost commensurate with its violating agreement. Attempts to improve relations with North Korea only in good faith will fail again and again.

▶Kim Sook: It is not unusual in terms of understanding the United States that President Biden’s inauguration address did not include the North Korean issue. I don’t agree that the North Korean issue is being pushed back to the top, although it may take some time to implement the policy. Nothing has changed in our diplomatic and security strategy and in our view of the world. The geopolitical importance of the Korean Peninsula remains the same. South Korea will play an important role in President Biden’s response to China. Kurt Campbell, India-Pacific Coordinator (Asia Tsar), and Sung Kim, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, are people who know Korea well.

The basic principles of the peace process have changed since the Berlin initiative in July 2017. North Korea’s pursuit of complete denuclearization, which was its original goal, weakened and raised doubts from the United States with inter-Korean relations focused on summit meetings, pursuit of easing sanctions against North Korea, and large-scale economic cooperation attempts to reverse sanctions. The appointment of Foreign Minister Eui-yong Eui-yong seems to be a measure to restore the final momentum of the peace process within the remaining term. The Biden administration has clearly drawn a line in the’top-down’ summit and is focusing on progress on denuclearization. There will be limitations to the Moon Jae-in administration’s pursuit of the peace process in the same way as before. If cooperation is emphasized based on the ROK-US alliance, meaningful progress can be made within the term of the Moon Jae-in administration. Even if you can’t complete something. You have to be realistic, you get nothing if you rush to greedy.

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△ Then, what kind of relationship do you think the Moon Jae-in administration should pursue?

▶Kim Sook: The government’s attempt to embrace North Korea and devote all its devotion to promoting the inter-Korean-North Korea-US summit has hurt the pride of the people. There were side effects and there were times when I was turned away. Some very cynical terms such as’Giseungjeonbuk’ and’Buragi’ appeared. We need to break away from such excessive North Korea-oriented and event-oriented, and pursue reciprocity based on sound and reasonable common sense. This will increase the likelihood of meeting our goal of pursuing the denuclearization of North Korea and the smooth progress of ROK-US relations.

The ROK-US summit should not be promoted too hastily. In the past, former President Kim Dae-jung also experienced the bitter taste of failure as a result of too hastened to hold a summit meeting with former President George W. Bush. It is more meaningful to promote working-level contacts first and to promptly attract the Secretary of State and Defense to visit Korea rather than a show ceremony.

▶Kwon Young-se: As the Moon Jae-in administration is approaching the end of its term, it will not be easy to change the existing tone urgently. However, the Moon Jae-in administration’s unilateral pro-North Korea and pro-China stance leads to isolation under the Biden administration. Of course, I don’t think President Moon will do that. However, basically, the ROK-US alliance should be solidified. We have to look at all issues based on the ROK-US alliance. The North Korean issue and Minister Eui-yong Eui-yong have also been newly nominated, so I expect that the approach will not be different from before.

▶Yun Byeong-se: At this point, there is a similar aspect to that of the late Kim Dae-jung and early Bush administrations in that the Korean government’s term of office is about one year and the Biden administration has four years. In 2001, while not fully grasping the policy direction of the new US leader, the first summit meeting was in a hurry, and the issue of the Sunshine Policy and the’Ballistic Missile Interceptor (ABM)’ agreement (the two countries) creaked. Our government faced great difficulties until the end of the term. It is important not to repeat trial and error, keeping in mind the cases where the first button was inserted incorrectly in the past.

▶Shin Gak-soo: It will take several months for the Biden government to get into action and come up with a policy toward North Korea. Only in the second half of this year can we determine whether negotiations will resume. Domestically, after the April by-election is over, the political power will move toward the next presidential election, which is likely to significantly affect the government’s policy enforcement power. As for the Korean government, the Biden government should start solving the North Korean nuclear issue as soon as possible. In drafting a policy toward North Korea, we must ensure that our position is reflected. It is also necessary to focus on devising a bargaining strategy based on the ROK-US agreement.

Consistent non-response to North Korea’s actions beyond the limits of North Korea, or responding to North Korea’s stubborn orders, such as the Anti-North Korea Warfare Act, is also undesirable for the development of sustainable inter-Korean relations. Because of the COVID-19 quarantine, South and North Korea should also avoid making unilateral proposals in a situation where it is difficult to even contact them.

It must be clear that the door to conversation is always open. However, it is necessary to take a leisurely attitude to talk if North Korea wants it. The more hurry the policy toward North Korea becomes, the more it becomes involved in the North Korean pace.

/ Jeong-ri = Reporters Kyung-hwan Yoon and In-yeop Kim [email protected]

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