Following the launch of a cruise missile on the 21st, North Korea fired a projectile, believed to be a ballistic missile, into the East Sea on the 25th. Four days ago, two cruise missiles were launched from the Oncheon area of South Pyongan Province to the west sea, and then they even carried out high-intensity provocations with ballistic missiles banned by the UN Security Council. North Korea’s successive provocations seem to be an attempt to draw concessions, such as easing sanctions, by pressure on the US government, Joe Biden, which is considering a new policy toward North Korea. It will also contain warnings about the recent joint training sessions between the United States and the ROK and meetings with the diplomatic and defense ministers of the United States.
Two hours after the North Korean missile launch, the government held an emergency meeting at the National Security Council (NSC) to express concern. However, while expressing the projectile as a’missile’, it did not come up with a judgment on whether it was a’ballistic missile’. This is in contrast to the Japanese government, which disclosed the North Korean provocations before us, accusing “North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile as a serious task for the international community,” and that the US media even raised the possibility of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Earlier, even after detecting North Korea’s launch of a cruise missile, the South Korean military opened it and bought a glare only three days after foreign media reports. Although the intention is not to stimulate North Korea, it is not an easy matter in that the North Korean missile launch is directly related to the safety of the Korean people. In addition, cruise missiles are threatening weapons that can change flight altitude and path. Nevertheless, it is unacceptable for any reason that the public became aware of the launch through foreign media rather than through government announcements.
In the meantime, it is not once or twice that the government has increased security distrust while looking at North Korea. The same is true of the absence of participation in the UN’s joint proposal for the North Korean human rights resolution for three consecutive years, and subtracting the denuclearization of North Korea from the’Korea-US 2+2′ joint statement. It is questionable whether our arguments will be persuasive when discussing specific policies of pressure on North Korea in the next week’s discussion of the security offices of the ROK-US-Japan security offices if the government is stuck in the peace process on the Korean peninsula and tries to ignore North Korea provocation. At such times, we must respond in principle based on close cooperation with the United States.
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