![[김성한의 한반도평화워치] Improving inter-Korean relations separated from denuclearization is the number of encouraging North Korean nuclear weapons.](https://pds.joins.com/news/component/htmlphoto_mmdata/202104/07/5944fb2e-912c-4945-a339-430d57c964fa.jpg "[김성한의 한반도평화워치] Improving inter-Korean relations separated from denuclearization is the number of encouraging North Korean nuclear weapons.")
North Korea’s nuclear cooperation plan
![Blue House National Security Officer Seo Hoon, U.S. White House National Security Adviser, and Japanese National Security Officer Shigeru Kitamura (from right) held a three-party meeting of the heads of the Korea-U.S.-Japan security office held at the Naval Academy in Annapolis near Washington, DC on the 2nd. We are walking and talking together. [사진 외교부]](https://i0.wp.com/pds.joins.com/news/component/htmlphoto_mmdata/202104/07/5944fb2e-912c-4945-a339-430d57c964fa.jpg?w=560&ssl=1)
Blue House National Security Officer Seo Hoon, U.S. White House National Security Adviser, and Japanese National Security Officer Shigeru Kitamura (from right) held a three-party meeting of the heads of the Korea-U.S.-Japan security office held at the Naval Academy in Annapolis near Washington, DC on the 2nd. We are walking and talking together. [사진 외교부]
The head of the National Security Office of Korea, the United States, and Japan met at the US Naval Academy on the 2nd to discuss cooperation measures to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. It can be said that it was created by the US Joe Biden administration to hear the opinions of its allies, South Korea and Japan, at the stage of finalizing its policy review on North Korea.
Key sanctions should not be lifted until North Korea’s actual denuclearization measures
At this point, improving inter-Korean relations could give North Korea an erroneous signal.
In view of the lack of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, cooperation with the US and Japan is essential.
The right direction is to strengthen a thorough defense system centered on Korea, the United States, and Japan.
When the US-North Korea, South-North, South-North and US leaders met in Singapore, Hanoi, and Panmunjeom in 2018–19, and expectations for the denuclearization of North Korea rose to the fullest, the central axis of policy coordination toward North Korea was between Korea and the United States. However, the former President Trump dealt with the North Korean nuclear issue in his own way, ended without much income, despite the deterioration of Korea-Japan relations due to the comfort women agreement and the Korea-Japan Military Information Protection Agreement (GSOMIA). Now, with the inauguration of the Biden administration, security cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan is emphasized, and the North Korean nuclear issue is expected to be dealt with through the mediation of the three countries. The change in the attitude of the Moon Jae-in administration, which expressed a willingness to improve relations between Korea and Japan from the end of last year, also helped.
With the end of the review of the US policy toward North Korea this month, the core of Korea-US-Japan cooperation in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue in earnest is the principle and method of negotiation. A comprehensive agreement on North Korea’s denuclearization, that is, a rough roadmap of how North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons and reach denuclearization under what conditions should be laid out. In the June 2018 agreement between the US and North Korea in Singapore, the descriptions are in the order of improving US-North Korea relations, establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. At the same time as North Korea viewed this as a comprehensive agreement, it considered the technical sequence of the three points (although the US disagrees) as a roadmap for denuclearization. The Moon Jae-in administration, which sympathized with North Korea’s position, saw the starting point of establishing a peace regime as the declaration of an end to the war (the Korean War) and persuaded North Korea to dismantle some nuclear facilities and accept the declaration of an end to the war (South, North, US, and China). see.
We need to patiently negotiate the denuclearization roadmap
However, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met with President Trump and made a proposal to exchange the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the lifting of economic sanctions, unexpectedly. Considering the nuclear facilities and nuclear materials that are operating or concealed in various places besides Yongbyon, the Yongbyon nuclear facility was only part of the North Korean nuclear program. However, Kim Jong-un, realizing the pain of economic sanctions, demanded that the sanctions be lifted instead of the declaration of an end to the war. Trump, who judged that the disposal of the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the lifting of sanctions were not mutually equivalent, rejected it at the Hanoi summit.
At the end of the second anniversary of the US-North Korea talks in Hanoi, if the position of North Korea is still unchanged, it is impossible for South Korea, the US, and Japan to reach a big deal (a comprehensive agreement) with North Korea, and a small deal (partial agreement) is not easy. Many of the officials of the Biden administration argue that it is an urgent need to freeze (stop) the North Korean nuclear program prior to the comprehensive agreement on denuclearization, as North Korea’s nuclear program continues to operate prior to the Big Deal. If the nuclear freeze isn’t the ultimate goal, that’s right. The question is, what counter-payments will be given to the nuclear freeze? It is difficult to lift or ease sanctions. The resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council since 2017 contain key measures that can change North Korea’s behavior, such as banning North Korea’s exports of minerals, aquatic products, and textile products, applying a cap on exports of crude oil to North Korea, and repatriating North Korean workers abroad.
Therefore, these key sanctions should not be lifted until North Korea has taken substantial denuclearization measures that make it impossible to return to nuclear development. A press statement released by the White House shortly after the meeting of the security officers of the ROK, US, and Japan also underlined the agreement on the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolution. Instead of making changes to the United Nations’ well-established economic sanctions on North Korea, a significant amount of humanitarian aid to North Korea could be considered as a counter-payment for the nuclear freeze. Nevertheless, comprehensive agreements and roadmap negotiations with North Korea must be carried out with persistence.
The most important thing to note here is the virtuous cycle of inter-Korean relations and denuclearization negotiations that the Moon Jae-in administration emphasizes. Apart from the negotiations on North Korea’s denuclearization, the relationship between the two Koreas is improved to create a synergy effect, but it may give a false signal to North Korea. It becomes possible to judge that Korea is the weakest link that can destroy the cooperative system between Korea, the United States, and Japan. If South Korea, the largest party to the North Korean nuclear issue, does not negotiate well on denuclearization, it will make North Korea a nuclear power if it can improve inter-Korean relations. In fact, we will take the lead.
South Korea, the United States, and Japan prepare measures to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles
Lastly, if this Korea-US-Japan talks were an opportunity for’strategic communication’, as the Blue House Security Officer Seo Hoon said, as part of the U.S. policy review work, Korea, the United States, and Japan can deter and defend North Korea’s nuclear and missile systems. As for the plan, close consultation should follow. The ability to detect and destroy signs of a North Korean ballistic missile attack in advance, and a multi-layered interceptor system to defend against ballistic missiles when they are launched, can be even more robust when Korea-US-Japan cooperation in information assets. The core of the North Korean missile response system is its surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that can detect the movement of North Korean weapons systems from the air 24 hours a day. Considering the reality that our independent surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are remarkably insufficient, cooperation between the United States and Japan is essential. North Korea’s nuclear and missile is a’clear and present danger’. Even if the issue of history with Japan or the transfer of the wartime control right with the United States is dealt with separately, it is a hundred times the right choice to reinforce a thorough defense system centered on Korea, the United States, and Japan to protect the lives and property of the people.
The success of the Korea-U.S.-Japan council depends on the coordination of Korea-Japan relations and North Korea policy
In 1999, during the Kim Dae-jung administration, the North Korea Policy Coordination and Supervision Group (TCOG) was established between the three countries to effectively establish and cooperate with North Korea. It was a consultative body for the vice-minister of the three countries’ foreign ministry. In addition to North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues, North Korea’s support issues were discussed. Meetings were held alternately in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo. In the early days, it played a role in promoting the six-party talks by meeting each time the six-party talks were made and announcing a joint statement. There may have been various causes for the short-lived TCOG, but the position of Korea and the positions of the US and Japan were disparate over the North Korean policy, and the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which was launched in February 2003, decided that it was difficult to overcome it and did not resume any more. .
Of course, after the Roh Moo-hyun administration, successive governments held intermittent meetings for the distribution of ministers, vice-ministers, and vice-ministers, emphasizing the need to cooperate with the ROK, US, and Japan on North Korea policy, but it was not possible to conduct dense consultations by operating institutional channels like TCOG. This is because Korea-Japan relations, regardless of conservative and progressive governments, struggled over historical issues, making it difficult for the ROK-US-Japan cooperative system to work properly on security issues. In the case of the progressive government, it was difficult to cooperate with Korea, the United States, and Japan as it caused a misunderstanding that it was closer to the position of North Korea and China than the United States and Japan.
The Moon Jae-in administration was no exception. However, with the launch of the Biden administration, which recognizes the threats of North Korea and China at almost the same level, the security policy control tower, the ROK, US, and Japan security offices gathered to provide a place for strategic communication. If this is made regular, it can become the highest-level consultative body that surpasses TCOG in the past. If it is difficult for the heads of the security office to gather, a three-party consultative body at the level of the vice-minister in charge of diplomacy may also be considered.
However, the success of the trilateral council depends on how well South Korea manages relations with Japan as in the past, and how well the US-Japan position on North Korea policy and the ROK position are well coordinated. It is also important to understand China’s movements as much as North Korea’s attention to the strengthening of the security cooperation system between Korea, the United States, and Japan.
Sunghan Kim Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, Former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
