![[정치]Intensifying confrontation with’North Korean missiles’…](https://image.ytn.co.kr/general/jpg/2021/0327/202103271218337546_t.jpg "[정치]Intensifying confrontation with’North Korean missiles’…")
■ Cast: Won-Gon Park / Professor of North Korean Studies, Ewha Womans University, Ho-Ryung Lee / Research Fellow, National Defense Research Institute
* The text below may differ from the actual broadcast content, so please check the broadcast for more accurate information.
[앵커]
When President Biden issued a warning message to North Korea about North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile, North Korea immediately rebelled, saying it was a provocation against the sovereign state’s exercise of its right to self-defense. North Korea has even revealed the possibility of further provocations. Let’s examine North Korea’s hard-line response and how it will affect the North and South-North relations in the future with Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, and Lee Ho-ryeong, a research fellow at the Defense Research Institute. Hello? First, North Korea gave a talk today. I have a discourse, but I think it is worth paying attention to the person who presented this discourse. In the case of Vice Chairman Lee Byung-cheol, isn’t it the key person in charge of North Korea’s strategic weapons, nuclear weapons and missiles? What do you think is the meaning of this kind of person’s direct discourse?
[박원곤]
It is North Korea’s best-known defense and military field. And just by looking at his title, it can be seen as one of the most important members of the Party’s Political Bureau, Vice Chairman of the Military Committee of the Party Central Committee, and Secretary of the Party Central Committee Committee. Although North Korea ranks the ranks like this, in fact, since it is a single-person system, there is a judgment as to whether the rest of the ranks are so meaningful. I think that the discourse in that name can be found quite meaningful. The previous talks between Choi Sun-hee and Kim Yeo-jeong have their own meaning, but I think the highest rank of disarmament personnel came out and talked about it, especially because it is a matter of weapons and missiles they fire.
[앵커]
In particular, in the case of Lee Byung-cheol, hasn’t you been promoted unusually in recent years? Shouldn’t it be considered that Chairman Kim Jong-un’s credibility is so thick?
[이호령]
right. Since 2018, the ranks have risen very quickly. So, after the breakdown of the Hanoi talks, when asked to pick two representatives from the military field, one of them is Lee Byeong-cheol. Of course, under the Kim Jong-un regime, Lee Byeong-cheol had a position in the early days, but he took all of the major positions in earnest after 2018 and 19. In that respect, we have been interested in the rise of Lee Byeong-cheol, but this time, we have been interested in the rise of Lee Byeong-cheol. I did it for the first time, and will this focus on Lee Byeong-cheol’s discourse, or North Korea’s actions that have been shown in the meantime have led to the discourse with the main characters. So, it seems to be a little different story whether we will see Lee Byeong-cheol’s statement in such an extension.
[앵커]
First of all, what kind of person Lee Byung-cheol is, and why should we pay attention to this? In the end, North Korea did not bend its will to develop nuclear weapons, strategic weapons, and so-called ballistic missiles.
[박원곤]
That’s right. When you look at the content of the discourse, there are many things that are quite meaningful. The biggest reason they set their cause is that the strategic task for the rapid reinforcement and development of the defense industry announced at the 8th Party Congress was passed. So, since it was ordered by Kim Jong-un, it is judged that the missile was launched this time because he said that he would develop a tactical nuclear weapon in the process of actually implementing it. President Biden raised a question about the missile launch at a press conference for the first time in an official position, so they talked about it in response to it, and they have all the rights, even if it has just been well reported. They are talking about why they are not allowed to launch these tests to form the right to self-defense. In addition, there was a strong voice of warning against the United States. Of course, it did not turn into a completely hostile relationship with the United States. Because President Biden’s real name was not mentioned, that is, President Biden, who is in power in the United States, at that level. It was talked about at the same level as the president of the United States. If North Korea goes into full-fledged hostilities, a real name will come out and an unspeakable last word will begin, but since it is not at that stage, it has yet to open relations with the United States. Nevertheless, it is judged that a kind of provocation in the future was actually a strong discourse that was in large part predicted.
[앵커]
You said that the provocation was also a notice, but if you look at North Korea’s progress in the meantime, it is the 2nd US-North Korea summit. After the breakdown of the Hanoi talks, in some ways the crunch continued, but when there was a presidential election in the United States, it showed a little bit of silence. In January, even after the new administration of Biden was launched, it remained silent for a while, but this month, after Labor Vice President Kim Yeo-jeong announced the first talk, talks continued to come out one after another, and the cruise missile was actually launched. It’s showing that the level of provocation is gradually increasing. How should it be interpreted?
[이호령]
I don’t think there is a need to look at two aspects. When we look back at the contents of the 8th Party Congress, there are two aspects. First, it emphasizes the fact that in the field of defense, we have exceeded our goals in relation to the achievements of the past five years since the 7th Party Congress. On the other hand, in the economic sector, it was said that the goal was not achieved very much, and it was said that it was poor, and in relation to achieving the goal for the next five years after the 8th Party Congress, the economic sector was very emphasized. I’m emphasizing the part that says to do it. Then, despite the fact that the defense field was overachieved a lot at the 7th Party Congress, the fact that North Korea continued to relate to new weapons in the future, emphasizing the part to achieve everything within the five-year plan for what should be implemented later. It can be seen as a predictable part that there will be a test launch. The second thing we need to pay attention to is that North Korea thought that such announcements related to the US policy toward North Korea would be released in the middle of this year to some extent, but it has progressed much faster than expected. So, it seems to me that what I wanted to see such a situation was a kind of reaction to the fast pace of the United States. Looking at it, on the day that Japan held the 2+2 talks between the US and Japan, Kim Yeo-jung’s statement was announced. Then, when we had a 2+2 talks between Korea and the United States, Choi Sun-hee’s speech came out. Then, the cruise and ballistic missile test firings followed immediately, followed by Lee Byeong-cheol’s statement. Looking at this procedure, first of all, I am not without the side that North Korea is basically a bit embarrassed about the US policy toward North Korea. And secondly, I think that North Korea is linking the process of pursuing basic achievements in achieving those goals pursued by the 8th Party Congress in the future with a card that pressures the US in relation to its policy toward North Korea. In that respect, it can be linked to why in the early days when the new administration of the United States entered the United States differently from before, it was quieter than a big provocation, and then started with a small provocation. In that respect, I will pursue similar provocations as they are today rather than such big provocations until 2021 and 2022, and pursue the achievement of those military goals they proposed, and next year we will be in the presidential phase. In that respect, I think that the greater provocation will increase the intensity at that time and proceed with it.
[앵커]
At the 8th Party Congress in North Korea, the doctor said that we need to keep an eye on the targets in the field of defense, but I remember that the part of the 8th Party Congress that mentions tactical nuclei is the focus. However, the ballistic missile launched this time, is it the North Korean version of Iskander or Ataekims? KN-23, KN-24 There was a lot of controversy, but there is a picture prepared now on the screen. If you look at the screen released by North Korea, it is first confirmed with the North Korean version of Iskander, that is, KN-23. However, it is worth noting that the ballistic weight has been increased to 2.5 tons. Then, isn’t 2.5 tons large enough to carry a tactical core?
[박원곤]
That’s right. The KN-23 looks almost clear. It is also confirmed in the photo, and North Korea’s announcement says that it is a low-altitude gliding leap-type flight method. This is what I did when I first test fired the KN-23. That’s why I think it’s right, but it’s an improved version of the KN-23. This time, after the 8th Party Congress, the weight of the warhead that was shown at the rowing ceremony has been increased, and the total length has also increased by 1m. The 2.5 ton warhead weight you’ve pointed out precisely means a lot of different things. As you said, once the warhead weight becomes that large, there is a very high probability that North Korea will be able to carry nuclear warheads there. Of course, how much standardization it is? I think there is a stage for development in the future, but the biggest problem is that the technology to miniaturize the warhead is difficult, and that the warhead weight can be loaded as much as possible. Another is related to the crossroads. As the weight of the warhead increases, the range is related. The meaning is that the range is increased by reducing the warhead.
Because this is a trade-off method. North Korea said it was 600km and South Korea was 450m, but the actual range may be over 1000km. Because this is an improvement of the Russian Iskander-class, there are many results from the nation that the Iskander-class announced that the range was reduced to 550km due to the INF treaty between Russia and the United States at the time. If you go more than 1000km, you can go to Japan with all of Korea in your range. The most serious problem is that if tactical nuclear weapons and missiles are developed, it is very likely that the battlefield environment on the Korean Peninsula will change in the future. I think it’s a very serious problem because North Korea is preparing a missile, but I can’t check whether there is a nuclear warhead or a conventional warhead in it. If so, this could easily be expanded into nuclear war. That’s why in the 1970s it was agreed to have a similar weapon system and to suppress this by signing an INF treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States. If so, this is very difficult from the standpoint of our government. Lastly, it is correct to say that the defense system of Korea and the US missile defense system of the United States are virtually impossible to block. Because the Patriot MS-2 we have is much better than that… But it’s not altitude. There is something called M-Sem Block Two, but it can’t even prevent pull-up maneuvers and evasive maneuvers. So, with the existing missile defense system, the Ministry of Defense says it can be prevented, but there are many research results already available. I can’t stop it.
[앵커]
You said it’s a pull-up maneuver, but it’s a difficult term. After all, in general, if the interceptor system is a parabolic trajectory, it is calculated and intercepted, but it seems that it is not easy to intercept because it rises again from this descent phase. And in the case of the KN-23 Iskander-class you mentioned now, isn’t there something similar to our weapon system? Is the Hyunmu-4 a similar weapon?
[이호령]
Our Hyunmoo also has ABCD level. There are various types by varying the range and weight of the warhead depending on it, so I think North Korea will make various types centering on Iskander and KN-23. One of them is that in front of us, in the case of the current warhead Hyeonmu, it is a missile that fires with 2 tons, and the D is now Iskander, and I think that it was a new class test-fired this time. Since we do 2 tons, North Korea will do 2.5 tons. And the range is now about 450, but North Korea’s announcement is saying that it goes up to 600km. However, you can think about what it means to have such a heavy warhead weight in front of you. The fact that we succeeded in test firing with a weapon capable of mounting 2 tons from Hyeonmu weapons is that in the end, North Korea is hiding everything in an underground bunker so that we can bombard it. Correspondingly, I think that there is no aspect of showing off that we can sufficiently suppress this with any air defense power of 2.5 tons.
[앵커]
The reason I asked the Hyun-moo question like this is that North Korea’s discourse today is based on the level of self-defense rights. I asked because I wanted to hear your opinion about it. By the way, South Korea also has such a current level ballistic missile, why can’t it be developed because it is North Korea? Isn’t this logic a controversy in North Korea right now? However, in the case of North Korea, after conducting a nuclear test in 2006, since it can be combined with a ballistic missile capable of attacking other countries with nuclear weapons, isn’t it that the ballistic missile itself was banned regardless of range?
[박원곤]
That part is an important difference for me and what I think is important is the Hyunmu-4. At that time, our president went and did it. It has already been released. It seems to be a very powerful missile system because it has a range of 800 km, has a warhead weight of 2 tons, can penetrate underground, and if the range is reduced, the weight of the warhead increases, reaching 3 tons and 3.5 tons. But the biggest difference is that of conventional tandoori. This is a nuclear weapon. It’s a tactical hack. Its destructive power is incomparable. That’s the biggest difference. In fact, we fully admit that Korea’s missile capabilities are good. Our defense ministry always says that every time North Korea fires a missile, our missile capabilities are good, but the problem is that all of our missiles are conventional and that they can use nuclear warheads, it is incomparable to each other.
[앵커]
That’s why the international community is banning ballistic missile launches. I see. First of all, I have pointed out how the international community views North Korea’s weapons, our weapons systems, and the logic of the right to self-defense that North Korea has shot a few days ago, but the most important thing now is the position of the United States. President Biden held a press conference for the first time since his inauguration a while ago, and then spoke about North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile. I will listen first.
[조 바이든 / 미국 대통령 : 동맹과 파트너들과 협의하고 있고 대응이 있을 것입니다. 긴장 고조를 선택한다면 우리는 그에 따라 대응할 것입니다.]
[조 바이든 / 미국 대통령 : 어떤 형태든 외교가 준비돼 있습니다. 하지만 그것은 비핵화라는 최종 결과에 조건이 맞춰져야 합니다.]
[앵커]
In the end, the point is, if provoking, we will respond accordingly, but that did not completely close the door of dialogue again. How did you see it?
[이호령]
In the beginning of March, the United States presented rough guidelines in the National Security Strategy Guidelines. There is a rough direction of how the US policy toward North Korea will unfold in the future. Of course, the U.S. will focus on diplomacy, but rather than adapting everything to diplomacy, it is also providing conditions for the use of force when diplomacy does not work. In addition, we will discuss with alliances and partner countries and respond jointly. In a way, I think these three conditions ultimately contain all the basic directions in dealing with the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization. In the end, in dealing with North Korea’s denuclearization as a problem, it should be such a content that everyone can accept, as it relates to the basic and final purpose, and the way to promote it is diplomacy. The basics are that it will proceed according to the principles of diplomacy, but it will not take such an attitude that North Korea will not respond to any of these provocative actions just because it has diplomacy. So, looking at the fact that both pressure and dialogue are working together, I can see that the contents of President Biden’s press conference this time are unfolding in the same context.
[앵커]
The doctor said that pressure and dialogue are working together, but the symbolic behavior and symbolic appearance of opening this dialogue in the end is not the convocation of the UN Security Council, but the UN Security Council, where the ambassadors gathered, but a slightly lower level. The convocation of the sanctions committee against North Korea, where diplomats gather, is how the water level has been adjusted. Should I see it like this?
[박원곤]
There is room for it to be seen, but it can also be said that you have made a practical choice. If you take it to the Security Council anyway, it is very likely that China and Russia will oppose it, so additional sanctions are very difficult. Rather, if you go to the sanctions committee, it’s a group of experts, so North Korea violates UN Resolution 1718. And 1874 is also related. Looking at it, what can be strengthened among the existing sanctions here? It means that you can find that part. So I think it’s a practical choice.
[앵커]
China and Russia are among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
[박원곤]
The five permanent member states have so-called veto powers. Because of the vito power, only China or Russia or one of them should not be allowed to exercise vito rights. And when North Korea launched a short-range ballistic missile, the UN Security Council was convened. In fact, there were no additional sanctions there. So, for long distance, ICBM class, additional sanctions were imposed. Another thing is, with the current conflict between the US and China is very serious, hasn’t there been an exchange of letters between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping a while ago? In such a situation, expectations aren’t great about whether China will be on the side of North Korea. But what’s important is that Dr. Ho-Ryung Lee made an important point earlier, and we need to read the foreign policy of the Biden administration carefully. During the Obama administration, I actually tried to improve relations with North Korea and other so-called hostile countries very actively. So-called holding hands with the enemy. So, it’s already known that Ma offered a very active dialogue with North Korea, but in the end it wasn’t possible. The Biden administration is clearly different from that. This is because the value of liberal democracy is what the Biden administration puts at the core of its foreign policy. Value diplomacy high school. And the difference from the Trump administration is that the Trump administration has had conversations with such an authoritarian regime, Kim Jong-un, and Putin. It’s a clear policy that I won’t do that. In particular, all of this will keep China in check. Since China’s system is not a liberal democracy, if it is aimed at it now, it is not possible to put it forward, although it does not close the door such as a gesture of appeasement or an emphasis on dialogue about North Korea, where some talks about North Korea. If that happens, the foreign policy of the Biden administration as a whole is less reliable. So we need to accurately judge that part.
[앵커]
First of all, the US is adjusting its own water level, but it seems that even in the case of North Korea, it is adjusting the water level. Isn’t it particularly important whether Chairman Kim Jong-un attends? Because North Korea is the only dictatorship. This time, you showed that you were focusing on people’s livelihood without visiting. How did you view it?
[이호령]
First of all, the economic sector is the one that puts the front line at the 8th Party Congress. In terms of economy, North Korea is also advocating the most popular popularism, and the first policy that best fits this is the congratulations on the construction of 10,000 apartments in Pyongyang, and Chairman Kim Jong-un appeared there. And they are saying that they will continue to build 20,000 more units in the future. If you look at the various meetings and contents that are being shown now, centering on Chairman Kim Jong-un, the uprisings related to the economic sector that were claimed at the 8th Party Congress, followed by the reprimands on how well the cabinets are doing the economy. It’s being developed around these things. Does that mean that Chairman Kim Jong-un was less interested in the military field, or was he less interested because he did not appear? It doesn’t seem like that at all. So, why did Chairman Kim Jong-un appear in the construction field, but not in the test launch this time? I can also point out that in two ways. That is, it is related to the durability of the system internally in North Korea, so that Chairman Kim Jong-un focused more on such a move that looked very deeply at the inside. I can see it. Secondly, in relation to the missile test launch, Lee Byung-cheol is the first to present a dialogue, and in a way, it seems that there is not one aspect on behalf of Chairman Kim Jong-un. So, I want to emphasize this part very much, but it was a burden for North Korea to be actively taking steps at a stage in which the Biden administration’s visible policy toward North Korea is not yet available to do both. So I wonder if that aspect was considered together. [앵커] Biden’s administration’s tangible policy toward North Korea has not yet come out, so there is a burdensome aspect. However, after meeting the heads of the Korea-US-Japan security office next week, I wonder if the big picture and blueprint of the Biden administration’s policy toward North Korea will come out soon. What direction do you expect to come out?
[박원곤]
I think it’s almost done. Probably, meeting next week will remain as a final coordination with security chiefs in Korea and Japan. And the policy toward North Korea has already been revealed in many forms. So, some of the principles I’ve talked about for a while, the biggest principle is that the door of conversation is never closed. However, the key thing is that, unlike the previous Trump administration, the goal of North Korea’s denuclearization and complete denuclearization was clear. That’s what we’ve been talking about, the so-called CVID, is being applied again. Also, it is clear that sanctions can be contemplated in terms of corresponding measures, but it is not possible to preemptively ease or postpone sanctions. So, even if it is announced overall, we still have to wait a while to see how much detailed information will be known. The problem is that North Korea knows all of this. Therefore, as we know that the pre-treatment of the so-called US hostilities against North Korea that North Korea wants will not take place, from that point of view, it is possible that North Korea will start with a cruise missile and drive it to the so-called cliff-end tactics familiar to them, just as it was announced in Lee Byeong-cheol’s discourse I think is still big.
[앵커]
Doctor, lastly, I’m curious about what to do with our government. In the case of President Moon Jae-in yesterday, saying that the people are aware of the concerns about the North Korean missile launch, but that they know it, and that it is not helpful in dialogue is by no means desirable. At the same time, I emphasized the conversation. What should I do?
[이호령]
It contains both concerns. From the standpoint of the top policy makers, it is also very important to strengthen the defense posture against such threats from North Korea. Another thing, however, is that there are some areas where the crisis on the Korean Peninsula suddenly escalates to focus only on strengthening defenses, so I think there was not a very political statement that considered both of those areas. So, from our point of view, I think it will go in the direction that has been going on so far. The Ministry of Defense’s joint participation will go to the section on strengthening the defense posture against North Korea, and the government will continue to emphasize the aspect of continuing to emphasize the phase of dialogue for the remainder of the term. So, I think I will go out while managing this situation with two-track.
[앵커]
Moon Jae-in government’s term of office is running out. Is that possible?
[박원곤]
A few things are important to me. Most importantly, it is true that South Korea and the United States have different approaches, starting with the overall definition of North Korea’s denuclearization, as seen during the last 2+2 meeting through the Security Officer’s meeting next week. We need to finally tune it. Secondly, there is still a story about China. If so, it is also very important how Korea and the United States will take their public policy. In some ways, it may be more important than North Korea policy, but there must be coordination on that part. That part is also showing a very big difference. Third, North Korea will continue to tell you, how will the ROK and the US respond militaryly with the announcement that they will continue to do this provocation for any reason in the future? In the case of the KN-23 I mentioned earlier, it is a weapon that can become a very serious and deadly, so-called game changer that changes the battlefield environment. I think the most pressing issue is how the ROK and the US can cope with it.
[앵커]
Okay. In the future, it seems that the situation on the Korean peninsula must be closely watched. So far, we have been talking with Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University, and Lee Ho-ryeong, a research fellow at the Defense Research Institute. Thank you for speaking today.