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| ▲ At the time of the 2018 inter-Korean summit, with President Moon Jae-in watching, Chairman Kim Jong-un is writing a guestbook. Chairman Kim’s younger brother, Vice President Kim Yeo-jeong (right), is delivering a pen prepared. | |
| Ⓒ Korea Joint Photographic Reporter |
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On the 15th, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blincoln and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Tokyo before Seoul to discuss the issue of the Korean peninsula, on the 15th, in Pyongyang, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party Kim Yeo-jeong presented a talk. The discourse, which is 17 pages long in the manuscript, was reported on the 16th.
Kim Yeo-jeong’s discourse begins with the first sentence, “I heard the news that the South Korean authorities, who had suffered from deepening worries for a long time, were on the path to invasive war practice targeting the Republic of Korea from the 8th.” They devoted themselves to the ROK-U.S. combined military training (first half combined command post training) held on the 18th.
In a discourse, Kim Yeo-jeong criticized South Korea’s combined military training, saying, “It is because he has the confidence to deal with the aftermath of the turn despite our fair demands and the consistent condemnation of all the Korean people.” “The South Korean authorities will know better than anyone else how the North-South relations can become by continuing to heat up in the practice of the North Korean aggression in this way differently,” he pointed out.
North Korea’s criticism, the real meaning
One of the meanings of’what can happen in the future’ that Yeo-Jung Kim said is embodied in the passage of this discourse from the middle to the second half. He said, “We have organized the National Peace and Unification Committee, a dialogue organization with South Korea that has no reason to exist in the current situation where the South Korean authorities are steadfastly clinging to hostilities that deny dialogue and destroying the foundation of trust through persistent play of fire. “It has become compelling to put the problem on the schedule,” he said.
Damhwamun said, “Since there is no need for any cooperation or exchanges with the South Korean authorities who treat us as enemies, we are reviewing the issue of eliminating the Kumgangsan International Tourism Bureau and other related organizations.” He uses expressions such as “predict even the extraordinary countermeasures that he destroys,” and continues criticizing South Korea, leading to a message to the United States in two sentences.
“At this opportunity, we give a word of advice to the new administration of the United States, who is struggling to breathe gunpowder on our land from across the ocean. It would be better not to.”
It was the first official message to the Joe Biden administration. In terms of the whole volume, this talk is about ROK-US combined military exercises and is aimed at the South Korean government. In particular, it can be seen that it contains the meaning of de facto reorganization of the relationship with the Moon Jae-in government. “It is obvious that the road ahead of the South Korean authorities entering the end of their term due to this severe challenge will be very painful and uncomfortable.” It can be interpreted as a means of giving.
However, it is true that the discourse was aimed at the South Korean government and criticized the coalition training, but if it was announced solely for this purpose, the discourse is virtually empty. This is because the South Korean-related part, which accounts for most of the discourse, is not very new.
The fact that South Korea will not be able to withdraw from the combined training immediately was something that North Korea could foresee at the time of the signing of the September 19th Inter-Korean Military Agreement in 2018. It is a point that North Korea already knows well that South Korea cannot immediately shake off the hands of the United States just because five inter-Korean summits were held until September 18, the day before, and President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un held hands tightly. Considering this, it seems somewhat unnatural that the anger and disappointment of the joint training account for most of this talk.
The perception that South Korea will not be able to easily quit joint training is also revealed in Kim Yeo-jung’s discourse in March 2020. “I know the South also enjoys the joint military practice quite a bit,” he said.
It is not very natural for him, who expressed such familiarity with the ROK-US joint training, to rhyme with such things as “darely challenging”. This means that the real message of this discourse could lie in something other than coalition training.
North Korea’s talk, the recipient is the United States?
It can be seen that the real message that North Korea intended was not even in the abolition of the Fatherland Peace and Unification Committee (Jopyeong-tong) and the Geumgangsan International Tourism Bureau. The elimination or reorganization of Jopyeong-tong does not impart desperate significance to inter-Korean relations. The same is true of the abolition of the Mt. Geumgang International Tourism Bureau, which is not effective. Even if such organizations are abolished or reorganized, it will not be easy to give more shock than the bombing of the Gaeseong Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office on June 16 last year.
The warning of breaking the 9.19 agreement is also difficult to have a substantial impact on future inter-Korean relations. If the agreement, which has no practical effect, is officially abolished, only the number of reasons North Korea will use to criticize South Korea’s dependence on the United States will be reduced. The official breach of the 9.19 agreement could further stifle inter-Korean relations, but it should be taken into account that South Korea will not face significant disadvantages.
The long mention of new or impractical content shows that the real intention of the discourse is not in that part. Considering that the discourse has been discussed not only in South Korea but also in the United States, it can be concluded that the real message can be two sentences at the end.
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| ▲ US President Joe Biden (right) and Secretary of State Tony Blincoln (left). The photo shows a speech on foreign policy at the Washington DC State Department building on February 4th. | |
| Ⓒ Washington EPA = Yonhap News |
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This is because the two sentences containing the message to the United States, although short, contain practical content. The warning that “it would be better not to create a sleek job from the start” can be seen as having substantial significance in that it is putting a brake on the North Korean policy that the US intends to initiate. It can be interpreted that this message is aimed at a new roadmap that the Biden administration will soon undertake.
As emphasized before and at the US-Japan state secretary and defense ministers’ meeting on the 16th (2+2), the Biden administration regards the ROK-US alliance as well as the ROK-US-Japan cooperative relationship as a means of resolving North Korea policy. This is to apply the stance of’restore alliance relations’ to North Korea relations as well.
It can be said that Kim Yeo-jung’s discourse contains a sense of rejection for this part. It is feared that the Biden administration’s approach will reduce North Korea’s position.
The fact that North Korea has recently carefully looked into the dynamics of the Korean peninsula issue with South Korea’s increasing international influence is also indirectly buried in Kim Yeo-jung’s talks in March last year. In this discourse to the United States, Kim Yeo-jeong, assuming his personal opinion, said, “It is not a friendship between the two leaders, but a mechanical and moral equilibrium between the two countries must be maintained and fairness must be guaranteed. I will be able to do it,” he emphasized.
As such, it is difficult for North Korea to accept the Biden administration’s policy toward North Korea, which has the potential to not only guarantee South Korea’s right to speak, but also add Japan’s right to speak. Perhaps the core sentiment of this talk is the rejection of the biden approach that can break the epidemiological balance that North Korea hopes for and weaken the status of North Korea.
The inside of North Korea’s discourse, that South Korea and Japan should fall into it
If the real message of this Kim Yeo-jeong discourse is directed to the Biden administration, the joint training and criticism of South Korea, which account for most of the discourse, can be interpreted by linking with the Biden administration. What Kim Yeo-jeong consistently suggested in the discourse was the message that’North Korea does not trust South Korea’. The abolition of Jopyeong-tong can be seen as an indication that South Korea may not be treated as a partner for reunification and dialogue.
The message stating that South Korea is not trusted and not recognized as a conversation partner seems to reveal hopes that the Korean Peninsula issue will be brought into the structure of the two countries in North America. It can be interpreted that this is to block the possibility that the Biden administration maintains the trilateral structure of the North and South America or transforms the structure into the North and South America structure.
The title of Kim Yeo-jung’s discourse, “The Spring Days Three Years Ago, Will Be Difficult to Come Back” can be seen as targeting the United States. He warned that if the United States uses a method that weakens North Korea’s status, it will be difficult to reproduce the atmosphere of peace in 2018.
The fact that Kim Yeo-jung’s talk was aimed at the United States also appears on the date of the announcement. The 15th is also the day when the joint training is in progress, but it is also the day when the US Secretary of State and Defense Secretary went on a tour of East Asia such as Korea and Japan. It can be seen as sending the meaning of’I can’t agree with the way the United States is thinking’ towards the United States.