![In the first half of this year, the ROK-U.S. combined training was held on a schedule from the 8th to the 9th, and military vehicles are lined up at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi-do on the afternoon of the 8th. [연합뉴스]](https://i0.wp.com/file.mk.co.kr/meet/neds/2021/03/image_readtop_2021_230651_16153867814568981.jpg?w=560&ssl=1)
In the first half of this year, the ROK-U.S. combined training was held on a schedule from the 8th to the 9th, and military vehicles are lined up at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi-do on the afternoon of the 8th. [연합뉴스]The stumbling block of the ROK-US alliance was resolved by early settlement of negotiations on the government’s drifting defense cost share, but instead, it faced a large increase in the share of the ROK-US alliance. This is because the rate of increase in contributions after 2021 is not linked to the inflation rate (4% or less) as in the past, but it has been agreed to be linked to the increase rate of the government’s defense spending (7~8%). Accordingly, the cost of the Korean government in the final year of the agreement is expected to reach 1.5 trillion won, a further increase of 500 billion won compared to the previous agreement.
In a press release related to the 11th Special Agreement on Defense Sharing (SMA) released on the 10th, the Korean government announced that the ROK and the United States have signed an agreement that is valid for six years from 2020 to 2025. In 2020, when the agreement was vacant, it was decided to freeze at 1,38.9 billion won, the same as in 2019, and the total amount in 2021 is 1,183.3 billion won, an increase of 13.9% from 2020.
The problem is that it has decided to apply the rate of increase in defense spending instead of the rate of inflation for the increase after 2021. In the 8th and 9th SMAs, etc., the increase in the amount after the first year was only raised by the inflation rate, and even that was limited so that it could not be increased by up to 4% or more. This means that the rate of increase in the first year was, in effect, the real rate of increase throughout the validity period.
However, the rate of increase in defense spending over the past three years was △7.0% in 2018, △8.2% in 2019, and △7.4% in 2020, averaging 7.5%, far exceeding the inflation rate. Assuming that the growth rate of defense expenditures will remain at this level from then on, the estimated amount of defense cost contributions to be borne by the Korean government is △1,272 trillion won in 2022 △1.367 trillion won in 2023 △1.4 trillion won in 2024 △1,5802 trillion won in 2025, etc. Becomes. If it remains like this, it is likely to break the 1.5 trillion won wall after surpassing the 1 trillion won mark, which was the’psychological majino line’ at the 10th SMA signed in 2019. This agreement gives the feeling that our side has made more concessions in that it is not very different from the plan that the Korean government proposed as the “last draft” during the US administration of Donald Trump.
In March last year, our negotiation team passed a multi-year contract in working-level negotiations that applied an increase of 13.6% in the first year and the increase in defense expenditures in subsequent years. Negotiations broke down while demanding a short-term contract. Afterwards, the expectation that the new president Joe Biden, who criticized Trump’s demands as “extortion of the alliance,” would take office and that negotiations would be conducted under much better conditions, but the final agreement was the same as the Maginot line proposed during the Trump administration. A high-ranking official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with reporters at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs office in Seoul on the same day and said, “For the fair share of defense expenses, it is important to have a share that is appropriate for the national power.” In addition, it is said that the establishment of new operational support items that were controversial in the past during the Trump administration and the stipulation of the introduction of advanced weapons in the United States were not mentioned in the negotiations with the Biden administration.
Diplomatic and security experts are fortunate to reach an early settlement, but expressed concern that the cost burden has increased. Cho Tae-yong, who served as the 1st Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 1st Deputy Chief of the Blue House National Security Office, said, “I received the impression that the increase has increased, but I welcome the conclusion of the negotiations as a whole.”
On the other hand, Moon Jeong-in, chairman of the Sejong Institute, said, “It will be difficult to increase defense expenses in the future due to the financial deficit.” In addition, the negotiating teams of the two countries expanded the lower limit of the labor cost allocation ratio for defense cost contributions from 75% to 87%, and stipulated a rule that, in the event of a blank agreement, labor costs equivalent to the previous year’s level can be paid for the first time in the agreement. This blocked the possibility of a recurrence of unpaid leave for Korean workers in the USFK, which occurred during the 2020 agreement gap.
[한예경 기자 / 안정훈 기자]
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